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Abstract
Whether and how to recognize business enterprises as organizational "entities" and legal "persons" that bear
enforceable rights, privileges, and responsibilities has been one of the most vexing issues in the history of legal
thought. These issues, though often raised with respect specifically to corporations, are relevant to business
firms in general.1 Debates about whether business firms are simply "legal fictions" created by the state or "real
entities" that exist independently as institutions trace at least to classical Roman times.2 These debates mirror
an historical tension between "topdown" and "bottom-up" perspectives on business enterprises. An
appreciation of these two perspectives helps to explain and resolve the differences among the main competing
legal theories of the firm.
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Foundations of the Firm I: 
Business Entities and Legal Persons 
Whether and how to recognize business enterprises as organizational "entities" and 
legal "persons" that bear enforceable rights, privileges, and responsibilities has been 
one of the most vexing issues in the history of legal thought. These issues, though 
often raised with respect specifically to corporations, are relevant to business firms 
in general. 1 Debates about whether business firms are simply "legal fictions" created 
by the state or "real entities" that exist independently as institutions trace at least to 
classical Roman times. 2 These debates mirror an historical tension between "top-
down" and "bottom-up" perspectives on business enterprises. An appreciation of 
these two perspectives helps to explain and resolve the differences among the main 
competing legal theories of the firm. 
An institutional theory of the firm 
"Top-down" legal theories see business firms as creatures of the state. The Roman 
jurist Gaius expressed this view as follows: 
Partnerships, collegia, and bodies of this sort may not be formed by everybody at will; for this 
right is restricted by statutes, sew1111s cons11ltt1 [rules], and imperial constit11tio11es [edicts]. In a 
few cases only are bodies of this sort permitted. For example, partners in tax farming, gold 
mines, silver mines, and salt works are allowed to form corporations. Likewise, there are 
certain collegia at Rome whose corporate status has been established by [law], for example, 
those of the bakers and certain others and of the shipowners .... Those permitted to form a 
corporate body consisting of a collegimn or partnership ... have the right on the pattern of 
1 The literature on this topic is both broad and deep. For an overview, sec Alfred F. Conard, 
Corpomtions in Perspective (Foundation Press 1976), pp. 417-45. Contemporary treatments derive 
from original discussions in Europe, especially in Germany and France. Id., pp. 417-19 (citing 
especially the work of Friedrich von Savigny and Otto von Gierke in Germany and Rene Clemens 
in France). See also Ron Harris, "The Transplantation of the Legal Discourse on Corporate Personality 
Theories: From German Codification to British Political Pluralism and American Big Business," 63 
Wt1shi11gton mu{ lee lmo Review 1421 (2006). 
2 Sec Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, "The Cyclical Transformations of the Corporate Form: A Historical 
Perspective on Corporate Social Responsibility," 30 Del,1wt1re ]011rnt1! of Corporate lt1w 767 (2005). 
For an historical treatment of this jurisprudence in the United States, see Gregory A. Mark, Comment, 
"The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law," 54 U11iversi1y of Chimgo L110 
Review 1441 (1987). 
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10 Business Persons: A Legal Theory of the Finn 
the state to have common property, a common treasury, and an attorney ... through 
whom ... what should be transacted and done in common is transacted and done.3 
On this ancient view, business firms exist only at the behest and at the pleasure of 
government. 
More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court expressed this top-down conception of 
the firm in a famous, often repeated declaration by Chief Justice John Marshall in 
the Dartmouth College case: "A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intan-
gible, and existing only in contemplation oflaw. Being the mere creature oflaw, it 
possesses only those properties which the charter of its creation confers upon it, 
either expressly, or as incidental to its very existence."4 The top-down view sees the 
business corporation-and, by extension, any business enterprise-as the subor-
dinate subject of law and, derivatively, of the governments that charter or otherwise 
recognize them. 5 
The "bottom-up" point of view of the participants in business firms yields a 
different, almost opposite legal theory. Although the law may provide the basic 
social structure and "rules of the road" for the creation and operation of business 
firms, participants who invest their own wealth, time, labor, and knowledge in a 
business enterprise tend to favor the recognition of legal rights and obligations that 
inhere in the enterprise itself. Participants' see firms as representing, derivatively, 
their own interests and expectations, rather than those of a sponsoring government. 
Although the Roman emperors were intolerant of this participants' point of view, 
the long-term history of the business enterprise suggests that the emergence of 
a bottom-up view has gained traction in various geographical locations over the 
longue duree. 6 Traces of the bottom-up view appear even in the ancient Roman 
debates, though they are less easy to make out than the top-down declarations of 
control by emperors.7 At least some early Roman firms had the right to pass the 
equivalent of bylaws to govern their own affairs.8 
A bottom-up view comports also with the long-term historical trajectory de-
scribed by Friedrich Hayek of a "spontaneous order" of firms that grow in diflerent 
shapes and sizes once a basic legal infrastructure has been put into place.9 Hayek 
J Dig. 3.4.1 pr.-1 (Gaius, Provincial Edict 3) (Alan Watson trans. 1985), quoted in Avi-Yonah, op. 
cit., p. 773. Collegi,1 included private clubs, religious groups, and informal economic organizations. 
·1 Dartmouth College v. W'ood111,1rd, 17 U.S. 518,636 (1819). Modern cases that cite this language 
favorably include Cf'S Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987) and Citizens United 
v. Federal Election Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876, 950 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
5 In fact, D,1rtmo11th College held against the government, finding that a royal charter creating a 
private institution could not be constitutionally altered by New Hampshire under the Contracts 
Clause. 17 U.S. at 624-53. The case is discussed further below in Chapter 3 with respect to the public/ 
private distinction. 
6 Fernand Braudcl, The Perspective of the W'or!tL- Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century, 
vol. Ill (trans. Sian Reynolds) (University of California Press 1992), pp. 619-23. 
7 See Avi-Yonah, op. cit., pp. 775-6 (citing passages from Ulpian). Different legal theories ofbusiness 
organization have been "cyclical" in terms of their adoption and influence. Id., pp. 767, 770-813. 
8 Sec Samuel Williston, "History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800," 2 Harvard 
law Review 105, 121 (1888). 
9 See Friedrich A. Hayek, law, legislation, mu! liberty: Volume I, Rules and Order (University of 
Chicago Press 1973), pp. 35-54; Friedrich A. Hayek, The Road to Se,filom: Text and Documel/fs 
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accounts for the top-down versus bottom-up dichotomy as the difference between 
an imposed or "made" social order (ta.xis) and a "grown" or spontaneous social 
order (kosrnos). 1° For Hayek, economic markets constitute a "catallaxy," that is, 
"the special kind of spontaneous order produced by the market through people 
acting within the rules of the law." 11 Although business firms must comply with 
relevant law, on this view, they also create and define themselves-and then make a 
legitimate claim to an independent right to existence and legal recognition on the 
basis of this self-creation. 
In the United States, the Supreme Court has at least implicitly endorsed this 
bottom-up point of view as well, such as in Santa Clam County v. Southern Pt1cijic 
Railroad. This case extended the constitutional principle of"equal protection under 
the law" to business corporations as well as individual human beings as "legal 
persons." 12 (Some scholars, emphasizing that this case declared corporations to be 
"persons," have urged a nefarious conspiracy theo1y claiming that corporate lawyers 
hijacked the Fourteenth Amendment designed to protect former slaves to serve 
corporate masters instead. But this historical interpretation has been debunked. 13) 
The Santa Clam case held that the aggregation of private property in a business 
corporation deserves constitutional respect (in the specific context of the assessment 
of an unequal corporate tax) because the property belonged, derivatively, to the 
individual investors in the enterprise. 14 In this manner, the Court adopted a 
bottom-up view of the individual interests represented by the corporation. The 
Supreme Court has more recently extended this legal notion of the constitutional 
protection of corporate "persons" in other contexts, such as in the controversial 
Citizens United case, which asserted First Amendment free-speech rights for business 
corporations in political elections. 15 Despite the top-down language of Dartmottth 
(University of Chicago Press 2007) (1945), pp. 71-3. See also John Gray, Hayelt on liberty (Routledge, 
3rd ed., 1998), pp. 25-55, 118-25. 
10 Hayek, Law, Legis!t1tio11, mu/ Liberty: Volume 1, Rules 1111d Order, op. cit., pp. 35-54. 
11 Friedrich A. Hayek, Law, Legis!11tio11, mu/ Liberty: Volume 2, The Mimge of Socid justice 
(University of Chicago Press 1976), pp. 108-9. See also Gray, Hayek 011 Liberty, op. cit., pp. 34-40. 
As Gray explains, Haye k's idea of"spontaneous order" includes three distinct elements: (I) ii!/ i11visib!e-
h1111d thesis that "social institutions arise as a result of human action but not by human design"; (2) ii 
tacit or pmcticd knowledge thesis that "our knowledge of the world, and especially of the social world, is 
embodied first of all in practices and skills, and only secondarily in theories"; and (3) ii thesis of the 
mttrmtl selection of competitive institutions that cultural traditions as "whole complexes of practices and 
rules of action and perception" undergo "continuous evolutionary filtering." Id., pp. 33-4. I do not 
address all of these elements here. Suffice it to say that I agree with Hayek that the bottom-up view of a 
"spontaneous order" describes one side of the theoretical problem of the nature of firms. But 
I emphasize the other side too: the top-down taxis of law as well as the bottom-up kos111os of self-
organizing markets. 
12 118 U.S. 394 (1886). See also Avi-Yonah, op. cit., pp. 793-4. 
13 See Mark, op. cit., pp. 1463 and n. 62. See also James Willard Hurst, 71Je l.egitinlilcy of the 
Business Corpomtion in the United States, 1780 to 1970 (University Press of Virginia 1970), pp. 66-8 
(finding insufficient evidence for this "conspiracy theory" of constitutional law). 
1·1 See Mark, op. cit,, pp. 1463-4. For a more recent case limiting the principle of equal protection 
as applied to business corporations, see W'estern mu! Southern l.ife lnsumnce Co. v. S(ltte Bo11rd of 
Eqwtlization of Californi11, 451 U.S. 648 (I 981 ). But cf. Gmnhol111 v. He11lt!, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) 
(voiding under the Commerce Clause legislation discriminating against our-of-state firms selling wine). 
15 Citizens United, op. cit. See Chapter 7 below for further discussion of this case. 
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College, then, some constitutional cases involving business enterprises adopt a 
bottom-up view, rather than simply allowing the government to adopt and enforce 
any new rules or impositions at all with respect to its "creatures." The Supreme 
Court recognizes and protects constitutional rights for corporations and other 
business entities as "persons" in some cases but not others. 16 
The jurisprudence of recognizing business enterprises to have "personality" and 
treating them as "entities" is complex. Legal scholars who have ventured into this 
literature, however, have consistently identified three major legal theories of the 
business enterprise. 17 Two of these theories represent the top-down and bottom-up 
perspectives. I will label them the concession theory (top-down) and the participant 
theory (bottom-up). A third-which I will call the institutional theory-captures an 
intermediate perspective that views firms as existing at a social level between 
political states and individual people. The institutional theory helps to explain and 
clarify the meaning and usefulness of both top-down and bottom-up theories. These 
two legal theories remain important and often applicable, as long as either one or the 
other is not adopted as the only theoretical truth. In my view, the institutional theory 
allows for a coherent explanation of the main legal theories of the firm. For a 
schematic overview of some key features of these theories, see Table 1.1. 18 
The concession theory of business enterprise represents the top-down perspective 
of the political state. It holds that business enterprises, including corporations, arc 
simply the creations of government. For example, the English East India Company 
existed because the King granted a charter to create it. 19 On this theory, it follows 
also that the act of creation authorizes the King to determine the nature and scope 
of the activities of his institutional "creature."2° From this perspective, business 
16 For treatments of this topic from different perspectives, see, e.g., Phillip I. lllumberg, 171e 
lvfultint1tion11! Challenge to Corportttion L11w: The Set1rch for ,z New Corporttte Persontl!ity (Oxford 
University Press 1993), pp. 24-5, 30-45; Jess M. Krannich, "The Corporate 'Person': A New 
Analytical Approach to a Flawed Method of Constitutional Interpretation," 37 Loyo!tt University 
Chimgo L11w Jotmuzl 61 (2005}; Carl J. Mayer, "Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the 
Ilill of Rights," 41 H11stings Law Journtd 577 (I 990); Larry E. Ribstein, "The Constitutional Concep-
tion of the Corporation," 4 Supreme Court Economic Review 95 (I 995}; Note, "Constitutional Rights 
of the Corporate Person," 91 Y11le L11w Jo11rnal 1641 (1982). 
17 The extent to which scholars agree on a tripartite division of the leading theories is remarkable. 
See Avi-Yonah, op. cit., pp. 771 (noting that "the same three theories of the corporation" have recurred 
over the course of"two millcnia"}; H.L.A. Hart, "Definition and Theory in J urisprudcnce," in Ess,zys in 
jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford University Press 1983), pp. 24-5 (describing "three great theories 
of corporate personality"). See also John C. Coates IV, Note, "State Takeover Statutes and Corporate 
Theory: The Revival of an Old Debate," 64 New York University Law Review 806, 808-24 (1989}; 
Mark M. Hager, "Bodies Politic: The Progressive History of Organizational 'Real Entity' Theory," 50 
University of Pittsb11rgh Lt1w Review 575, 579-80 (1989); Ron Harris, op. cit., pp. 1423-4; Michael 
J. Phillips, "Reappraising the Real Entity Theory of the Corporation," 21 Florida State University Lttw 
Review I 06 I, I 063-73 (I 994}; Sanford A. Schane, "The Corporation ls a Person: The Language of a 
Legal Fiction," 61 T11lt1ne Law Review 563, 564-9 (1987). 
18 This approach may represent an example of dialectical reasoning. On the usefulness as well as the 
dangers of triadic dialectical reasoning, see Karl R. Popper, "What ls Dialectic?" 49 Mind 403 (1940). 
19 This theory has also been called the "grant theory." See, e.g., Mark, op. cit., p. 1452. 
20 One theorist goes so far as to call this the "creature theory." See, e.g., Schane, op. cit., pp. 565-9. 
The metaphor has led some opponents of corporations to imagine them as artificial monsters. See, e.g., 
I. Maurice Wormser, Frttnkemtein, lncorport1ted (McGraw-Hill 1931). 
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Table 1. 1 The main legal theories of the firm 
Concession 
theory 
f'(lrticipant 
theory 
Institutional 
theory 
Social perspective 
Top-down view that political states "grant" firms 
rights to exist 
Bottom-up view that firms are created by the 
individual people who compose them 
Intermediate view that firms are understood as 
institutions both formed according to legal rules and 
organized and run by individual people 
Primary focus 
Government as law-giver 
Individual participants 
Pinn itself as an "entity" 
(or group of entities) 
firms exist only because governments say so. They exist, in other words, only "by 
concession" of government. This theory is compatible with strong versions of state 
capitalism. Firms are viewed as subordinate (and perhaps even subservient), and 
they are subject to strict government oversight and direction.21 
The prtrticipant theory of business enterprise takes a bottom-up perspective of 
individual people who aggregate together within a firm. On this view, states may 
allow for the existence of firms, and governments may grant some of the original 
charters for companies and corporations. Once these authorizations are given, 
however, and once the individual participants invest their wealth, time, labor, 
and knowledge in advancing the purposes of the enterprise, there is a shift in 
legal emphasis over time. The individual participants begin to possess cognizable 
rights and interests within the firm that the state should not, according to this 
theory, extinguish by fiat. 
The advent of legal templates for the creation of business organizations-such 
as the general incorporation statutes adopted in the United States and Great 
Britain in the nineteenth century and then spreading throughout the world-
reinforced this bottom-up, participant theory of firms. General or "free" incorp-
oration statutes were adopted first in the United States (at the level of different 
states, beginning with New York in 1811) followed closely by Great Britain (at 
the national level in 1844). They responded to political pressures against the 
"special privileges" of companies or corporations chartered by special acts of 
legislation or by monarchs.22 Once governments removed themselves from the 
21 Friedrich von Savigny advanced an early version of this view in Germany. See, e.g., Katsuhito 
lwai, "Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate Personality Controversy and Comparative 
Corporate Governance," 47 Americ,m joumal of Comparative Law 583, 601-2 (1999); Arthur 
W. Machen, Jr., "Corporate Personality," 24 H11rVttrd Law Review 253,255 (1911). 
22 See Hurst, op. cit., pp. 25-33, 135; He111y Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, and Richard Squire, 
"Law and the Rise of the Firm," 119 H11rv,ml Law Review 1333, 1386-7, 1394-6 (2006); Mark, op. 
cit., pp. 1450, 1453-4. The adoption of general incorporation statutes for businesses in the United 
States followed an earlier type of general incorporation statute for religious or charitable institutions 
which included for-profit businesses that could demonstrate a "public service," such as insurance 
companies and banks. Ronald E. Seavoy, "The Public Service Origins of the American Business 
Corporation," 52 Business History Review 30 (1978). 
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direct "chartering" of business firms (with continuing exceptions, such as govern-
ment corporations or business licensing requirements), they tended to follow a 
version of the participant theory. 
The approach of market capitalism followed by most countries today emphasizes 
free markets of self-organizing firms. This approach supports the participant theory 
of the firm, though competing varieties of market capitalism may have different 
views about who counts as a legitimate business "participant," particularly with 
respect to regular or rank-and-file employees. 23 Some legal systems (and some 
firms) tend to recognize employees as true participants, and others tend to categor-
ize employees as mere "inputs" to a firm's production processes. These different 
views of firms, their relationship to government, and the role of employees (among 
other variables) reflect theoretical controversies in different disciplines, including 
law, economics, and political theory, as well as geographical and cultural differ-
ences. 
In any event, the participant theory, broadly construed, maintains that the 
business enterprise is created as an aggregate entity by and for its participants. 
The firm "belongs" to its participants and not the government. This "belonging" of 
members to an organization depends on the recognition of this relationship by the 
legal order, as Hans Kelsen emphasized, which is much different than saying that 
the relationship depends directly on a top-down governmental authorization or 
"concession."24 The legal recognition of a firm follows from recognition of the 
aggregated rights and interests of the people who constitute it. 
A third view develops an intermediate position. The institutional theory sees firms 
as socially established entities that are both authorized and recognized by govern-
ments and organized and managed by individual participants. The institutional 
recognition of the business enterprise as a legal "entity" or "person" interposes a 
conceptual separation berween the political state and the firm's individual partici-
pants. Once a regular legal process for the governmental recognition and individual 
creation of firms has become established, business firms become social institutions. 
In legal terms, they become "entities" and "persons" with specified legal rights and 
obligations. The most important of these rights and obligations (which are assumed 
without much reflection in legal practice today) include: (1) the holding of a legal 
name; (2) the designation of a place of residence or citizenship; (3) the ability to sue 
and be sued in court; (4) the power to own tangible and intangible property, 
including real estate and other capital; (5) the capacity to make contracts, incur 
debt, and enter into other financial arrangements in the name of the firm; and 
(G) the right to self-govern by adopting founding documents, bylaws, and other 
"private statutes."25 
2·1 On "market capitalism" versus "state capitalism," see Introduction, page 4 and accompanying 
note. Themes regarding this distinction are also further discussed in Chapters 3 and 5 below. 
2·1 Hans Kclscn, General Theory of Law and St,tte (Anders Weberg trans.) (Harvard University Press 
1945), pp. 98-9. 
25 Sec Williston, op. cit., pp. I 16-17 (quoting Coke and Blackstone on these points with respect co 
corporations). Most of these general rights and obligations apply to other basic legal forms of business 
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Law plays a dual role here, integrating top-down and bottom-up theories. First, 
the government adopts statutes, supplemented by judicial decisions, which set forth 
the "rules of the game" for the establishment and governance of firms. These rules 
are then adjusted over time and within constitutional limits to address various 
policy issues that arise. Constitutional limits in the United States, for example, 
include a prohibition of the expropriation or "caking" of the property of a business 
enterprise without "just compensation," such as in the "nationalization" of a private 
business firm converting it to government ownership. 
Second, individual participants rely on and use this established legal framework 
to create firms by entering into organizational contracts, as well as formally 
registering these firms with the government, when and if required. Individual 
participants arrange for the self-governance of their firms by doing the following: 
(1) adopting "constitutional" documents (such as the charter and by-laws of a 
corporation); (2) issuing governing resolutions via designated representatives (such 
as the board of directors in a corporation); and (3) following policies that authorize 
managers to run the firm through an ordering and structuring of the activities of 
subordinates.26 (As discussed in Chapter 5 below, variations in the governance 
methods of firms depend in part on the legal type of firm selected, e.g. corporation, 
partnership, or limited liability company.) 
The institutional theory of the firm is broad enough to encompass the main 
features of both the concession and participant theories. As such, it describes 
most of the world with respect to the legal structure of business enterprises 
today. This approach is also consistent with the philosophical and sociological 
approach to the firm chat is advanced by "institutional" theorists in various 
disciplines. The institutional theory shows how the legal system squares the 
circle of social and individual perspectives on the firm, and it also allows for 
legal analysis and historical change over time from both "macro" and "micro" 
points of view. 
Note that the institutional the01y advanced here emphasizes the recognition of 
firms as "entities" and "persons," but it does not require subscribing to what has 
been called the "real entity" theory associated most prominently and notoriously 
with the German legal theorist Otto von Gierke. The strongest version of this "real 
entity" theory holds that intermediary institutions such as business enterprises 
should be considered to have a metaphysically "real" existence and an "organic" 
institutional permanence separate from their individual participants. 27 Gierke even 
enterprise, such as partnerships, but corporations tend to have the broadest array of powers as "entities" 
or "persons." See Robert C. Clark, Corpomte Law (Aspen 1986), pp. 15-21. 
26 Cf. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corpomtion: A Leg,rl Analysis (Little Brown 
1976), p. 1 ("Corporate law is constitutional law; that is, its dominant function is to regulate the 
manner in which the corporate institution is constituted, to define the relative rights and duties of those 
participating in the institution, and to delimit the powers of the institution vis-a-vis the extend 
world"). 
27 For an account of this theory and its influence in the English-speaking world through the 
translations of Frederic Maitland and Ernst Freund (among others), sec Mark, op. cit., pp. 1464-78. 
See also William W. Bratton, Jr., "The New Economic Thco1y of the Finn: Critical Perspectives from 
History," 41 Stt1nfi1rd L11w Review 1471, 1490-1 (1989). 
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went so far as to posit a "physico-spiritual unity" of a "real corporate personality."28 
No such metaphysical assertions are made here. Instead, my argument is that 
business enterprises are social institutions created by human beings-and thus 
both "artificial" and "fictional" (rather than metaphysically "real"). Nevertheless, 
firms have a social ontological existence because they are artificial fictions that are 
legally reinforced in the real world. They are therefore "fictions" that become "real" 
and "actual" in an everyday, pragmatic sense. 
An institutional theory of the business enterprise that recognizes both the top-
down authority of government and the bottom-up authority of participants in 
intermediate institutions is consistent with the jurisprudence of Robert Cover. In 
Cover's view, law is best conceived as having a bottom-up feature-a norm-
generating "jurisgenesis"-as well as a top-down "imperial" aspect.29 Various 
non-state institutions, including religions and other organizations, develop a plur-
ality of normative systems or worlds (nomos). Governments then act through 
statutes and other legally enforceable rules to establish an "imperial" order in 
particular areas of social life and conduct. Courts and judges hold an intermediate 
position. They are "jurispathic" in that they suppress associational norms when 
they conflict with "imperial" law. On one hand, then, judges are "people of 
violence" because they impose a single law within their jurisdiction backed by the 
force of the state. On the other hand, judges are "people of peace" because they 
often play the role of finding compromises and resolving disputes between norma-
tive worlds without resorting to violence.30 
Cover writes that "modern corporation law continues to bear the formal charac-
ter of a grant of norm-generating authority" in the United States and, to extend his 
argument, elsewhere in the world. Cover refers to "company town[s]" and the 
original Massachusetts Bay colony in the United States as historical examples of 
strongly independent norm-generating associations.31 The delegation of internal 
law-making authority to promoters, organizers, and managers of firms remains a 
strong feature of contemporary enterprise law. Business participants make their 
own rules-and create their own "nomos"-subject to the "imperial" constraints of 
governing law. 
Although political states have often suppressed business enterprises (and other 
independent groups) or bent them to serve only political purposes in the manner of 
Roman emperors, the fongue dttree of history suggests that the idea of "associational 
autonomy" has become relatively strongly established in many places in the 
world.32 To this extent, non-state institutions-including but not limited to 
business enterprises-become a source of bottom-up normative arguments for 
28 lwai, op. cit., p. 616 (citing Maitland). 
29 Robert M. Cover, "The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative," 97 
Harvard Law Review 4, 4-18 (1983). 
JO Id., pp. 40-6, 53. 
31 Id., pp. 30-1. 
.1 2 Id., pp. 31-2. See also Eric W. Orts, "A Short History of the Business Enterprise" (unpublished 
manuscript, available from the author on request). For interdisciplinary treatments of "associational 
autonomy," see Freedom of Association (Amy Gutmann ed.) (Princeton University Press 1998). 
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the authority to make their own legal rules and interpretations. For Cover, the 
norm-generating features of freedom of association should translate into the legal 
recognition of the rights of certain groups. In his words: "Preedom of association 
implies a degree of norm-generating autonomy on the part of the association. It is 
not a liberty to be but a liberty and capacity to create and interpret law-minimally, 
to interpret the terms of the association's own being.".lj At the same time, the 
exercise of this associational freedom is subject to legal limits. 
Influential theorists have argued forcefully against a need to select among 
the several different legal theories of the business enterprise described above. 
H.L.A. Hart, for example, argues that "though these theories spring from the effort 
to define notions actually involved in the practice of a legal system they rarely throw 
light on the precise work they do there."34 He recommends a practical institutional 
approach. Hart brushes aside unhelpful debates, such as whether a firm is "a mere 
abstraction, a fiction, a metaphysical entity," and he calls for closer attention to "the 
legal rules of the game" about how terms such as the "corporation" are actually used 
and what legal consequences follow.35 
Similarly, John Dewey surveys the debates surrounding the idea of corporate 
personality and recommends caution. The idea of a legal "person," he says, is 
empty: it "signifies what law makes it signify." If one agrees that the legal reference 
to a "person" is simply to designate "a right-and-duty-bearing unit," then the most 
important questions shift from "regarding the nature of things" to thinking "in 
terms of consequences."36 
In my view, both Hart and Dewey support a pragmatic institutional approach to 
legal theories of the business enterprise.37 Dewey warns against relying too heavily 
on either the "concession theo1y" or the "fiction theory" because they have been 
used historically to support conflicting ends that are politically or otherwise 
determined. 38 He concludes that attention should focus on "concrete facts and 
·1-1 Cover, op. cit., p. 32 (original emphasis). For a controversial case in which the U.S. Supreme 
Court recognized a "right of expressive association" for groups, see Boy Sco11ts of Americ,1 v. D(lle, 530 
U.S. 640 (2000) (striking down a state law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 
as a violation of associational rights). But sec Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) 
(holding that a private business group did not have the right to exclude women); Rumsfe!tl v. Forum jiJr 
Academic mu! lmtitutional Rights, bzc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (upholding military recruiting access 
requirement to universities against a group-rights challenge). 
J/4 Hart, "Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence," op. cit., p. 25. 
J 5 Id., pp. 43-7. 
_ir, John Dewey, "The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality," 35 Yale Luo Journal 
655, 655-6, 660 (1926) . 
.17 Some may object that my interpretation of support by Hart and Dewey for an institutional 
theory is misplaced. Dewey in particular has been given credit (or blame) for contributing to "the 
decline of corporation theory" in the United States. Mark, op. cit., pp. 1478-83. Sec also Bratton, op. 
cit., pp. 1508-10 (discussing Dewey's influence on legal scholars). A close reading of Dewey, however, 
suggests that he did not rake the extreme position that the idea of legal personality should be 
abandoned. Dewey argued only that the idea itself should not drive legal and policy-related conclusions 
about the rights and obligations of legal persons. Hard policy questions remain concerning the 
definition and boundaries of organizational legal persons, but this docs not mean that the "persons" 
themselves somehow disappear from the analysis. 
·18 Dewey, op. cit., pp. 655-7, 663-9. 
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relations" rather than theories oflegal personality.39 Attention to the "concrete facts 
and relations" of the firm leads to a consideration of how the law creates these 
institutions, what the rules of the game are for them, and what social consequences 
obtain. The "concrete facts and relations" of the business enterprise refer, at least in 
part, to the legal infrastructure that permits their construction, recognizes them, 
and channels their activities. In addition, Dewey observes that legal results related 
to corporate personality have been driven by many different "non-legal consider-
ations," including "considerations popular, historical, political, moral, philosoph-
ical, metaphysical and, in connection with the latter, theological."40 These policy 
considerations should be made explicit. 
Hart expresses a similar view when he argues that "the essential elements of the 
legal corporation" become visible through how legal rules apply in particular 
contexts and circumstances to express a "unity" or "identity" in the actions of 
groups of people.41 The complexity of law, however, requires analytical care: one 
should not extrapolate a finding of legal "identity" under one set of circumstances 
to apply without reflection to another set of circumstances. (This concern relates 
also to the issue of the shifting boundaries of firms discussed further below, 
especially in Chapters 4, 5, and G.) 
A legal theory that sees the business firm as institutionally created can embrace in 
a pragmatic and therefore substantively open fashion the elements of the two other 
main theories, which focus on the prerogatives of both government and partici-
pants, respectively. One may read Dewey to say that adopting an intermediate 
institutional theory of this kind commits one to taking a substantive political and 
economic position.42 And this is true to a degree. At a minimum, the institutional 
theory assumes that both government and business participants have legitimate, 
substantive claims that deserve recognition. To this extent, the institutional theory 
does not adopt an entirely "positive" legal theory. It recognizes substantive insti-
tutional limits that extend minimal necessary roles to both governments and business 
participants, thus combining elements of both concession and participant theories.43 
The institutional theory of the firm is minimalist with respect to substantive 
political content because it leaves open for elaboration both (1) what substantive 
legal rules and restrictions government may impose; and (2) how far the aims and 
interests of business participants should be legally protected. 44 In other words, the 
39 Id., p. 673. 
40 Id., p. 655. 
·11 Hart, "Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence," op. cit., p. 30. 
4
i Dewey, op. cit., pp. 670-3. Specifically, Dewey makes this point against the early organic or "real 
entity" theorists such as Gierke, as well as more recent interpreters such as Harold Laski. Id. See also 
f larold J. Laski, "The Personality of Associations," 29 Harvard Lmv Review 404 (1916). 
•l.l Cf. H.L.A. Hart, 71Je Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 1997), pp. 193-200 
(describing a "minimum content of natural law" included in a theory of positive law). I will not elaborate 
extensively on the jurisprudential implications, except to say that the institutional legal theory of the firm 
advanccd here is compatible with several different jurisprudential orientations, including most if not all 
contemporary versions of legal positivism, legal realism, and natural law theory. 
4-t One may take a stronger political position with respect to the usefulness or normative desirability 
of societies that recognize, respect, and encourage the formation of intermediate non-state institutions, 
including business enterprises. These justifications might include an argument in favor of a vibrant 
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scope and breadth of substantive claims made by government (for regulation) and 
business participants (for limits on regulation and protection of their rights and 
interests) remain open for determination-both theoretically (through scholarly 
study and policy debate) and institutionally (through legal and political processes). 
Following the advice of Hart and Dewey, it makes better sense to decide specific 
policy questions with respect to the law applicable to business firms in particular 
contexts and situations rather than in general. 
In addition, an institutional approach allows for the possibility that multiple 
values and purposes may apply to decide particular regulatory questions. Relatively 
open procedural methods, such as democratic government and deliberative judicial 
decisions, enable choices among different values and purposes to apply in different 
situations, depending on the social context and the legal questions raised. Different 
values may also apply more strongly in some circumstances than others. For 
example, the economic consequences of a particular legal rule are not always easily 
known or estimated, and in these cases ethical arguments may have stronger 
persuasive force. 
An institutional theory of the firm describes a broad middle ground between the 
extremes that result from strict adherence to either a concession theory or a 
participant theory. Again, this institutional theory provides a moderate perspective 
by (I) recognizing that governmental regulation of firms makes sense on a policy 
level, but leaving open the substantive content and scope of this regulation for 
elaboration through political and legal processes; and (2) recognizing that some of 
the prerogatives and rights of individual participants represented in business firms 
deserve legal protection against government intrusion. 
On one hand, with respect to the prerogatives of government, multiple alterna-
tive policy objectives are available for selection. Some economists and law-and-
economists advocate the objective of promoting economic efficiency and overall 
wealth creation. This value is sometimes promoted as the only permissible objective 
to pursue in business regulation.45 Neo-mercantilist or "industrial policy" propon-
ents aim to advance national economic development, which has been one justifica-
tion used to support state capitalism and the promotion of nationalistic economic 
competition among different varieties of market capitalism. 46 In contrast with 
economics, philosophers often advocate justice and fairness as policy alternatives 
that focus, for example, on the inequality of wealth distribution.47 They may appeal 
"civil society" (as well as governmental protection of individual rights) and an argument that the 
existence of independent organizations of sufficient size and strength provide an institutional check on 
tendencies toward absolute government. Ilut these questions of political theory lie outside the scope of 
this book. 
·15 Sec, e.g., Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavcll, "Fairness Versus Welfare," 114 !!11rv,ml lmu Review 
961 (200 I) (arguing that values of social welfare should trump other considerations). 
46 For an example of a debate along these lines with respect ro national U.S. and Japanese policies in 
the l 980s, compare Robert Il. Reich, "Making Industrial Policy," 60 foreign AJJ:1irs 852 (1982), with 
Charles L. Schultze, "Industrial Policy: A Dissent," 2 Brookings Review 3 (1983). 
47 Sec, e.g., Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel, The Aiyth of Ownership: 7,rxes mid justice (Oxford 
University Press 2002) (arguing in favor of "negative" and "progressive" taxes from considerations of 
justice and fairness); Jared D. Harris, "What's Wrong with Executive Compensation?" 85 Joumal of 
I 
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also to other basic moral values such as honesty (e.g. the prohibition of fraud) or 
respect for property (e.g. the prohibition of theft). These moral values derive from 
either deonrological (duty-based) or utilitarian (consequentialist) moral prin-
ciples.48 Laws against insider trading, for example, may express primarily moral 
rather than economic principles.49 Governments may adopt any of these multiple 
values or objectives and promote them through the enactment and interpretation of 
laws applicable to business enterprise. 
On the other hand, a concern for the legal protection of the rights and interests 
of business participants recommends limits on governmental regulation, including 
(1) a prohibition of "takings" of private property (including business capital and 
financial investments) without compensation; and (2) guarantees of basic freedoms 
of self-organization and association.50 These kinds of constitutional and other legal 
limitations recognize that business firms are "self-created" rather than "state-
created."51 Takings jurisprudence, which draws difficult conceptual lines between 
private property and its permissible regulation, fits also within a more general idea 
in constitutional law of protecting settled expectations, especially with respect to 
property interests, while recognizing that the legal definition of property itself 
changes over time.52 Future-oriented, forward-planning business people tend to 
value stability, certainty, and the preservation of "settled expectations" in the law, 
which may also support other social and economic objectives.53 The growth of 
sustainable long-term economic development and cultural cohesion may depend in 
part on a relatively stable legal order. 
Business Ethics 147 (2009) (examining executive compensation levels on ethical grounds). For a critique 
of U.S. corporate law for ignoring concerns about wealth distribution, see Ronald Chen and Jon 
Hanson, "The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas of Modern Policy and Corporate Law," 103 
Michigan Law Review 1, 121-5 (2004). 
48 A line between deontological theories (positing fundamental moral duties) and utilitarian 
theories (deriving moral principles from expected or proven social consequences, most often in terms 
of measures of human welfare) divides modern ethical philosophy. See, e.g., Dale Jamieson, "Method 
and Moral Theory," in A Compmzion to Ethics (Blackwell Publishers 1993), p. 477. Other theoretical 
views are possible which prioritize a process of"moral theorizing" in practical circumstances rather than 
looking to apply a priori principles. See, e.g., id., pp. 478-86. For an attempt to unify competing 
ethical theories, see Derek Parfit, On What Matters, vol. 1 (Oxford University Press 2011). 
49 See, e.g., Alan Strudler and Eric W. Ores, "Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading," 78 
Texas Law Review 375 (1999). 
50 On constitutional "takings," see, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power 
of Eminent Domain (Harvard University Press 1985); William A. Fischel, Regulatory Tt1ki11gs: Law, 
Economics, and Politics (Harvard University Press 1995). On freedom of association, see pages 16-17 
and accompanying notes 32-3. 
51 Laski, op. cit., p. 413. 
52 See Laurence H. Tribe, Amerimn Constitutional Law (Foundation Press, 2nd ed., 1988), 
pp. 587-613. 
53 See Frederic R. Couderr, Certt1inty and justice: Studies of the Conflict Between Precedent mu! 
Progress in the Development of the Law (D. Appleton 1914). For a theory emphasizing the preservation 
of expectations, see Niklas Luhmann, Lt1w as ,1 Socill! System (Klaus A. Ziegart trans.) (Fastima Kastner 
et al., eds.) (Oxford University Press 2004); Niklas Luhmann, A Sociological Theory of Law (Elizabeth 
King and Martin Albrow trans.) (Routledge and Kegan Paul 1985). See also Thomas D. Barron, 
"Expectations, Institutions, and Meanings," 74 California Law Review 1805 (1986) (book review). 
Foundations of the Firm l· Business Entities and Legal Persons 21 
Two extremes: concession theory and participant theory 
By embracing the perspectives of both government and business participants, the 
institutional theory of the firm described here is consistent with most existing legal 
systems in the world today. The substantive virtues of this institutional theory are 
illustrated by considering the extreme outcomes that would follow from adhering 
only to the concession theory or only to the participant theory. 
The concession theory, taken alone, is too authoritarian with respect to the 
business enterprise. It may have appealed to ancient Roman emperors and old 
English monarchs, but in part exactly for this reason it conflicts with a contempor-
a1y viewpoint that accords basic respect to individual human rights, including 
positive freedoms of association and negative freedoms against arbitraty disposses-
sion.54 To subject business enterprises entirely to the whims of government (even 
one that is democratically elected) would run roughshod over the most basic rights 
that most countries today recognize for individual citizens-who are also individual 
participants in business firms-such as human rights to property and freedom of 
association. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, enshrines 
the following provisions. 
• "Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with 
others."55 
• "No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his [or her) properry."56 
• "Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association."57 
• "Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and 
favorable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment."58 
Most nation-states provide for similar or analogous legal protections of these rights 
in their constitutions or basic laws. 59 
Some modern versions of state capitalism adopt a strong concession view, which 
influential policy makers seem to hold today in China, Russia, and elsewhere, 
which can often violate basic rights. This view, at least when taken to its extreme, is 
incompatible with the varieties of capitalism (and their accompanying legal 
regimes) that recognize and respect basic political and economic rights. And it 
51 For the distinction between positive and negative freedom, see Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of 
Liberty," in Isaiah Berlin, 771e Proper Study of Ma11ki11d: An Anthology of Essays (Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux 1998) (Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer eds.), pp. 191-242. The value of freedom to engage 
in economic activity, including participation in private business enterprise, is also central in 1-layekian 
theory. Sec, e.g., Hayek, law, legisl1tio11, 1111d liberty: Volume I, Rules r111d Order, op. cit.; Hayek, l11w, 
legislation, and Liberty: Volume 2, The Mirage ofSocirtljustice, op. cit. 
55 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), sect. 17(1). 
56 Id., sect. 17(2). 
57 Id., sect. 20( I). 
58 Id., sect. 23(1 ). 
59 See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, 7'lie Right to Privr1te Property (Oxford University Press 1988), p. 18 
(noting protection of property rights "around the world"). 
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almost goes without saying that these rights of associational freedom, property 
ownership, and labor must be respected in actual practice as well as simply written 
into formal constitutions or statutes. 
Extreme versions of the participant theory of the firm also go too far. Standing 
alone, this theory amounts to nothing much more than a theory of anarchy (or at 
least a very strong libertarianism). On its own terms and taken to its logical 
conclusion, this theory of the firm asserts that only the interests of individual 
participants matter. Even though the legal framework that makes firms possible is 
provided by government-in addition to any specific organizational privileges that 
might be extended (such as limited liability, discussed further below and in 
Chapter 4)-the extreme version of this theory posits that government should 
refrain from setting any limits to what participants may do through the organization 
and use of firms. Some of the so-called Lochner-era cases of the U.S. Supreme Court 
in the 1930s, which struck down broad-based business regulations such as min-
imum-wage laws as unconstitutional infringements of basic rights to "liberty," 
approached this extreme.60 To forbid any government regulation of business 
enterprises that would abridge private contracts or private property would swing 
the institutional pendulum too far in the direction of protecting entrenched 
business participants and disregarding legitimate public interests expressed through 
government. 
Admitting that business firms play a central role in modern social life and 
therefore share an institutional responsibility for negative as well as positive conse-
quences for their actions should prove sufficient to demonstrate that adopting an 
extreme version of the participant theory goes too far. Given the foundational role 
of government in providing the legal infrastructure for firms, it seems relatively 
uncontroversial that some level of further regulation may be needed (with the 
extent and scope of the regulation left open for further elaboration). This regulation 
may include both the prohibition of harmful activities and the encouragement of 
positive actions by firms. In economic terms, regulation may counter "negative 
externalities" (such as environmental pollution) and encourage "positive external-
ities" (such as reducing crime by encouraging the expansion of employment).61 In 
fact, the very idea of an economic "externality" assumes a corresponding organiza-
tional "internality." It is within firms that the internal economic calculations and 
decisions are made-which do not include the external social costs or benefits that 
these decisions may impose outside of the firm. Economic accounts of "external-
ities" regarding business decision-making therefore recognize (at least implicitly) 
the institutional existence of firms as real legal "persons" or "entities" that follow 
internal self-governing processes. 
60 For a review of cases, sec Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitution,tl Law, vol. I (Foundation 
Press, 3rd ed., I 999), pp. 1332-8 I. Even at the high-water mark of this era, however, more regulatory 
measures were constitutionally upheld than struck down. Id., p. 1344 and n. 4. 
61 Sec, e.g., Harold Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights," 57 American Economic Review 
347, 348-9 (I 967). 
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President Woodrow Wilson may have expressed the point too strongly when he said: 
A corporation [or other business firm] exists, not of natural right, but only by license oflaw, 
and the law, if we look at the matter in good conscience, is responsible for what it 
creates .... If law is at liberty to adjust the general conditions of society itself, it is at liberty 
to control these great instrumentalities which nowadays, in so large part, determine the 
character of society. 62 
Wilson's use of the word "control" suggests that he may fall somewhat closely to the 
extreme of the concession theory rather than an institutional perspective. 6.3 A more 
moderate interpretation of Wilson's observation, however, seems difficult to deny: 
namely, that the government should play an important role in setting the ground 
rules and basic operational parameters for the creation, organization, and manage-
ment of business enterprises. From the perspective of legal theory, the substantive 
provisions of the regulation of business firms (as well as constitutional or other 
structural limitations on such regulation) are best left open for elaboration through 
political and deliberative processes. 
If contemporary China and Russia are places where concern about an overly 
rigorous application of the concession theory of business enterprise is justified, the 
United States may illustrate the perils of adopting an extreme version of the participant 
theory. At present, the business-related jurisprudence in the mainstream of academic 
law in the United States (and, to a lesser extent, in other English-speaking countries) 
borrows its substantive legal theories of the firm mostly from the discipline of 
economics, following the success (in terms of institutional influence in leading law 
and business schools) of the law-and-economics movement.6;, This approach tips the 
balance too far toward participants and against government interests. 
Law-and-economics is well-described as "a leading example of a highly successful 
legal ideology" with particularly strong influence in business-related fields, includ-
ing the law of enterprise organization.65 (Note that to say that a philosophical or 
jurisprudential movement is "ideological" is not to say that other approaches arc 
"non-ideological." The question is rather whether the theoretical assumptions and 
views expressed arc right, true, or useful.) Law-and-economics as a jurisprudential 
62 Woodrow Wilson, Governor's lnaugLtral Address, Minutes of Assembly of New Jersey, January 
17, 1911, pp. 65, 69, reprinted in The 1'11blic Papers of Woodrow Wilson (Ray Stannard Baker and 
William E. Dodd, eds.) (Harper 1925-7), vol. II, pp. 273-5, and quoted in Louis K l.iggettt Co. v. l.ee, 
288 U.S. 517,559 n. 37 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting in part)) (emphasis added). 
6-1 Prior to becoming President, Woodrow Wilson played a significant historical role in the 
development of corporate law in the United States as Governor of New Jersey. The state of New 
Jersey had become a haven for incorporations, and then Governor Wilson led a charge for reform. As a 
result, many leading corporations moved to incorporate themselves in Delaware (which had copied 
New Jersey's permissive statute)-following a famous "race to the bottom" (or, according to scholars 
favoring regulatory competition, a "race to the top") in U.S. corporate law. For an overview, including 
Wilson's role, see Christopher Grandy, "New Jersey Corporate Chartermongering, 1875-1929," 49 
Journ,rl of Eco11omic History 677 (1989). Sec also Chen and Hanson, op. cit., p. 143. 
6·1 For the classic and most inHucncial example of this approach, see Richard A. Posner, Eco110111ic 
Awzlysis of lt1w (Aspen, 7th ed., 2007). 
65 Spencer Weber Waller, 'The Law and Economics Virus," 31 Gm/ow I.aw Review 367, 367-8, 
379-90 (2009). 
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movement has had deep influence, especially in U.S. law schools. One recent 
historical analysis concludes: "Simply measured in terms of the penetration of its 
adherents in the legal academy, law and economics is the most successful intellec-
tual movement in the law in the last thirty years, having rapidly moved from 
insurgency to hegemony."66 
The influence of economic theories with respect to the business enterprise has 
been especially acute.67 The currently dominant economic theories of the firm 
focus almost exclusively on individual participants-a consequence of methodo-
logical individualism. Law-and-economics jurisprudence with respect to business 
firms tends therefore to favor the principles of freedom of contract, freedom of 
association, and the protection of private property of the participants in business 
rather than to adopt the perspective of government. In other words, a deregulatory 
and even anti-regulatory bias (except perhaps for regulatory or constitutional 
protection of individual participants' rights) is built into a legal theory that takes 
contemporary neoclassical economic models as its guide. There are exceptions, and 
law-and-economics scholarship has grown to become highly diverse normatively as 
well as methodologically. It is also quite possible for economic analysis to take a 
broader view. For example, one well-known founder of law-and-economics has 
focused his fire on both the failure of government to regulate in a manner that would 
have prevented or at least significancly reduced the risks of the financial meltdown 
of 2008, as well as on the failure of economists to predict the problems. 68 Neverthe-
less, the overall bias or critical "tilt" of law-and-economics scholarship is well-
known and derives from the underlying theoretical positions taken by the leading 
neoclassical economists.69 Recent historical accounts reveal also that at least some 
of the influence oflaw-and-economics derives from anti-regulatory political as well 
as intellectual sources, especially through the funding of private think tanks and 
law-and-economics centers in law schools. 70 
66 S ccven M. T des, The Rise of the Conservative legt1l Movement: The Bt1ttle for Control of the lt11V 
(Princeton University Press 2008), p.216. For an assessment of the inAuence oflaw and economics from 
an insider to the movement, see William M. Landes, "The Empirical Side of Law & Economics," 70 
U11iversityofChiC11go law RevielV 167 (2003). See also Robert C. Ellickson, "Trends in Legal Scholarship: 
A Statistical Study," 29 jo11mt1l of legt1l Studies 517 (2000) (finding an increases in law-and-economics 
work published in law journals from 1982 to 1996); William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, "The 
Influence of Economics on L-iw: A Quantitative Study," 36 Jormurl of lmv and Economics 385 (I 993) 
(finding significant increases in terms of citation counts of law-and-economics work). 
67 For a heavily influential example in U.S. corporate law, see Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel 
R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate law (Harvard University Press 1996). See also l3rian 
R. Cheffins, Company lmv: Theory, Structure, t1nd Operation (Oxford University Press 2007) (applying 
economic analysis in British law); Reinier R. Kraakman et al., The Ant1tomy of Corporate la1V: 
A Compt1mtive mu! fimctiont1l Appro,1ch (Oxford Universiry Press, 2nd ed., 2009) (applying economic 
analysis in comparative perspective). For another leading source that employs economics as its lodestar, 
sec William A. Klein, John C. Coffee, Jr., and Frank Partnoy, Business OrgttniZlltion 1111d Finance: legal 
and Economic Principles (Foundation Press, 11th ed., 2010). 
68 Richard A. Posner, A failure of Ct1pitt1lism: The Crisis of '08 and the Descent into Depression 
(Harvard University Press 2009); Richard A. Posner, The Crisis of Capitalist Democmcy (Harvard 
University Press 20 I 0). 
m For a critique along these lines, see Chen and Hanson, op. cit, pp. 7-66. 
70 See Kirn Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: The Businessmen s Cnwzde Against the New Deal 
(W.W. Norton 2009), pp. 162-3, 167; Teles, op. cir., pp. 90-134, 181-219. 
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In any event, most law-and-economics views of the firm, including so-called 
"contractarian" theories of the firm discussed in Chapter 2, adopt a relatively 
extreme version of the participant theory of the firm. Dissenting legal academics 
warned that followers of law-and-economics who adopted an exclusively "aggre-
gate" rather than an "entiry" theory of the business firm would lead to unpleasant 
consequences, but their voices were not heeded.71 The global financial meltdown 
beginning in 2008-which most observers believe to have been caused mainly by a 
combination of factors including general deregulation, an overly laissez-faire ap-
proach to investment banking, and the under-regulation of new financial products 
(such as credit default swaps, subprime mortgages, and various kinds of securitiza-
tions)-may have taken the shine off the deregulatory presumptions of traditional 
law-and-economics.72 As of this writing, however, the larger global trends with 
respect to regulation and the influence of traditional law-and-economics in the 
United States and elsewhere are unclear. 
In addition, the business participants considered most relevant for law-and-
economics theories, which closely follow neoclassical economic models, are capital 
investors or "owners." One can roughly divide capital investors in business enter-
prises into the categories of "creditors" (who make various kinds of loans) and 
"equity owners" (including both shareholders in corporations and investing 
members of other firms such as partners who claim a share of residual profits of a 
business). Some legal theorists continue to insist on a distinction between debt and 
equity as essential, but actual practice has become more complex, including the use 
of hybrid debt-equity instruments.73 Blurring the distinction between debt and 
equity is not new. As one commentator worried as early as 1928: 
Stockholders and creditors are ... two distinct classes of people, whose interests in the 
corporation are of such different natures as to be often diametrically opposed .... Should 
resort to devices under which rights are conferred to be either the one or the other, as 
expediency may later dictate, continue to grow in popularity, the effect must be the ultimate 
breaking down of the barrier between stockholders and creditors, a result which will 
necessitate the re-writing of an important part of the law of corporations.7·1 
In contemporary practice, a "financial revolution" in investment products and 
options has indeed expanded the focus of financial views of the firm beyond simple 
assumptions of "shareholders as owners" and challenged the mantra of "shareholder 
value maximization" as the univocal objective of corporate firms.7 5 
71 Sec 13ratton, op. cit.; David Millon, 'Theories of the Corporation," 1990 Duke Law }oum,d201, 
201-4, 220-31 (1990). For an early critique, sec also Arthur Allen Leff, "Economic Analysis of Law: 
Some Realism about Nominalism," 60 Virgini11 L11w Review 451 (1974). 
72 See Preface, page xv and accompanying note 25. 
7.l For further explanation, see Eric W. Om, "Shirking and Sharking: A Legal Theory of the Firm," 
16 Ytt!e L11w 11nd l'olicy Review 265, 306-9 (I 998). 
7/4 E. Ennalls Berl, "The Vanishing Distinction 13etwcen Creditors and Stockholders," 76 University 
of l'ennsylvmzi11 L11w Review 814, 822-3 (1928). 
75 See Henry T.C. Hu, "New Financial Products, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation, and 
the Puzzle of Shareholder Welfare," 69 Tex,ts Ltzw Review 1273 ( 1991); Peter H. Huang and Michael 
S. Knoll, "Corporate Finance, Corporate L1w, and Finance Theory," 74 Southem Grlifomi11 Law 
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Much more narrowly but nevertheless predominantly, many economists and 
law-and-economists hold the view that the business participants who matter most 
are the equity investors: for example, shareholders in corporations rather than 
creditors or lenders. When taken into legal theory unadulterated, this economic 
view of the firm threatens to reduce the scope of policy analysis by focusing only on 
a select group of business participants (and arbitrarily excluding others) and at the 
same time ignoring the larger institutional and legal realities of firms. Even for 
theories that focus only on the financial ownership of firms, it is now recognized 
that a focus on the "entity" of the firm (and various entities often constructed 
within firms) is required in order to make sense of competing financial claims, at 
least when conflicts arise among equity owners, creditors, and the many "hybrid" 
financial interests in modern firms.76 
In addition, other business participants are considered important in different 
societies-sometimes equally so-including non-owner managers and employees 
as well as other capital providers and financial owners. The varieties of capitalism in 
different parts of the world today are distinguished in part by the different levels of 
legal protection provided to various groups of participants within firms. (A com-
plete specification of the "varieties of capitalism" in the world today is beyond the 
scope of this book.77 For the purposes here, I simply assume that several varieties of 
capitalism exist and elaborate how law contributes to the creation and maintenance 
of some aspects of this variety.) Politics as well as economics determine the relative 
legal status accorded to different participant groups in different countries. Vari-
ations are also negotiated in the form of specific organizational contracts and 
property structures (such as different voting and profit-participation rights for 
different equity and debt interests). One useful global analysis of interests within 
firms and the relative legal protections accorded to them in different countries refers 
to a tripartite divide within large firms among the following main groups: (1) 
investors (notably shareholders as well as creditors); (2) managers; and (3) other 
Review 175 (2000); Frank Partnoy, "Financial Innovation in Corporate Law," 31 jo11rnal ofCorpor,tte 
law 799 (2006); Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi Zingales, "The Influence of the Financial Revolution 
on the Nature of Firms," 91 Amerimn Economic Review 206 (2001). 
76 Sec, e.g., Hu, op. cit., pp. 1306-9. On the misuse of business entities in several high-profile 
scandals, see also William W. Bratton and Adam J. Levitin, "A Transactional Genealogy of Scandal: 
From Michad Milken to Enron to Goldman Sachs," 86 Southern C11lifamit1 Law Review (forthcoming 
2013). 
77 On different systems, see, e.g., Big Business ,md the Wealth of Nations (Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. 
et al. eds.) (Cambridge University Press 1997); Creating lvfodem C11pitalism: How Entrepreneurs, 
Companies, t11ul Co11ntries Tri11mphed in Three Industrial Revol11tions (Thomas K. McCraw ed.) 
(Harvard University Press 1997); A History of Corporilte Governance Around the World (Randall 
K. Morck ed.) (University of Chicago Press 2005); V11rieties ofCt1pitt1lism: The lnstitutiomtl Fo1111d11tiom 
ofCompamtive Adv,mt11ge (Peter A. Hall and David Soskice eds.) (Oxford University Press 2001). See 
also William J. Baumol, Robert E. Litan, and Carl J. Schramm, Good C11pitalism, Bad Ctzpit11lism, 1111d 
the Economics of Growth t11ul Prosperity (Yale University Press 2007); Charles Hampden-Turner and 
Alfons Trompenaars, The Seven Cultures of Ctzpit11lism: V11lue Systems for Creating We11lth in the United 
States, Britain, ]t1pt111, Germ11ny, France, Sweden, and the Netherlt1nds (Doubleday 1993); Ronald Dore, 
William L1zonick, and Mary O'Sullivan, "Varieties of Capitalism in the Twentieth Century," 15 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy 102 (I 999). 
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employees.78 A purely economic analysis of the firm focused only on financial 
owners elides the competing and often conflicting interests of these different 
groups. 
The existence of firms as persons 
Following an exclusive focus on business participants rather than the firm as an 
institution, one standard economic view has been to consider firms as merely 
"fictions"-thus recapitulating the misuse of a single theory of legal personality 
warned against by the likes of Hart and Dewey.79 Some economists, when pushed 
on the subject, conclude that there is really no topic for a theory of the firm to 
address at all. Eugene Fama, for example, is fairly explicit with respect to the 
implications of his financial theory of the firm. Rejecting "classical models" of the 
firm that emphasize ownership and management of assets, Fama secs the firm as "a 
set of contracts among factors of production, with each factor motivated by its self-
interest."80 On this view, the "ownership of the firm" is "an irrelevant concept."81 
The logical conclusion: There are no firms, but only an immense aggregate of 
individuals contracting and trading with each other. Firms, to the extent that they 
exist, are merely one form among many "sets of contracts" that may be chosen. This 
conclusion is not surprising, given that a method focusing only on individuals-
namely, the set of human beings who enter into contracts and own property-is 
assumed at the beginning of the analysis. In other words, "firms" as entities or 
persons with an ontological realiry separate from the human beings that constitute 
them are not believed to exist because of a priori methodological assumptions. 
Human beings exist, but firms don't. 
The institutional realiry of business enterprises belies this assertion of the non-
existence of firms. Asserting the non-existence of firms from an economic perspec-
tive denies or at least misunderstands the role of law in the instimtional creation, 
construction, and maintenance of firms. It also flies in the face of a blizzard of 
contrary perspectives from other disciplines, including law, which reveal and 
explain the social reality of firms. 
Note that even the starting assumption of a namral human being as the relevant 
"person" or unit assumed for economic analysis is problematic and requires law for 
definition and recognition. As the legal scholar Joseph Vining observes: "There is 
no such thing as a namral person [in law] .... A human being shifts among any 
78 Peter A. Gourevitch and James Shinn, l'olitic,tl l'ower and Corporate Control: The New G'lohal 
l'olitics of Corporate G'overn1111ce (Princeton University Press 2005), pp. 10-13, 57-83, 95-278. 
79 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Ilehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure," 3 joumnl of Fin,mcill! Economics 305, 310-11 
(1976). 
80 Eugene F. Fama, "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," 88 joum,t! of l'olitiml Economy 
288, 289 (1980). 
81 Id., p. 290. 
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number of identities during the day, during the year, and during his or her life: 
sports player, parent, drug taker, dancer, corporate director, juror, investor, auto-
mobile salesman, artist, and so forth." 82 Like firms, natural human beings are given 
fictional names at birth, and limits are placed on whether human beings have access 
to courts with respect to age and mental acuity (such as in the concept of"capacity" 
in contract law), as well as national citizenship and other qualifications (as reflected 
in various provisions of immigration laws). 
In addition, human beings, as well as firms, seek "standing" before courts in 
different kinds of roles. Again as Vining explains, "when a 'real' person comes 
before a court he [or she] does not come as a whole- ... but in one of his [or her] 
roles, as a tenant farmer, perhaps, or a drug user, or a religious believer, or an 
investor."83 Similarly, a firm can seek legal "standing" or recognition in different 
roles: as an employer, as a party to a contract with a supplier of goods, or as a bearer 
of certain constitutional rights. 
The legal recognition of firms as "entities" or "persons" in these respects cannot 
be avoided or short-circuited through appeals to economics, because economic 
analysis itself depends on the legal recognition and definition of the relevant 
"units," including human beings as well as firms. With respect to theories of the 
firm, law is therefore a necessary starting point for any coherent economic analysis. 
Major errors in economics and law-and-economics have occurred when scholars 
invoke vaguely defined legal concepts (such as "implicit contracts" or "agency 
costs") without a sufficient appreciation of the richness of the legal meaning and 
context of these concepts. 
From a legal point of view, then, the idea that "there are no firms" (and only 
individual human beings) is a non-starter. Firms as well as markets are created by 
law.84 Firms exist as legal "entities" and "persons" because statutes and courts have 
recognized them as such for centuries and continue to do so today in almost all 
modern societies. The legal infrastructure supporting the business enterprise as an 
institution relies on these concepts. For example, the very idea of a "shareholder" 
depends on the legal recognition of an organizational entity (namely, the corpor-
ation) in which one may hold or own a "share." The role of a "manager" or a 
"director" presumes the existence of an organizational "entity" to be managed or 
directed. At least one recent economic theory of the firm is generally consistent with 
the emphasis placed here on legal definition and recognition. A firm, on this view, is 
"a nexus of specific investments: a combination of mutually specialized assets and 
people ... [within] a complex structure that cannot be instantaneously replicated."85 
82 Joseph Vining, Legal Identity: The Coming of Age of Public Law (Yale University Press 1978), 
p. 59. 
s.1 Id. 
8·1 In discussing the difference between markets and firms, two influential legal commentators 
suggest chat degrees of "firmishness" might replace attempts co distinguish firms and markets. Klein, 
Coffee, and Parcnoy, op. cit., pp. 19-20. However, chis idea presupposes chat one can have a solid 
conception of a "firm" in mind from which varying degrees of"firmislmess" could then be deduced or 
approximated. 
85 Luigi Zingales, "Corporate Governance," reprinted in The Economic Nature of the Finn: 
A Ret1t!er (Randall S. Kroszner and Louis Putterman eds.) (Cambridge Universiry Press, 3rd ed., 
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Even if one concedes that firms are "artificial legal fictions," they are legal fictions 
with social consequences that are real, practical, and large. The nation-state is 
another example of an "artificial fiction." Like business firms, the nation-state has 
a legal and institutional reality (in the social rather than the metaphysical sense), 
and few would deny that the "imagined communities" of nation-states exist and 
matter greatly in practical affairs. 86 The legal scholar Arthur Machen made the 
point as follows: "The state, like other corporations, is actually an impersonal 
entity; by a legal fiction or metaphor, that impersonal entity is regarded as a person. 
Uncle Sam is a fictitious person; but the government of the United States is a 
reality."87 Nation-states matter because constitutional and international law recog-
nize these entities-and people who live within the geographical and conceptual 
boundaries of nation-states empirically believe in them. Alexis de Tocqueville said: 
"The government of the Union rests almost entirely on legal fictions. The Union is 
an ideal nation which exists, so to say, only in men's minds and whose extent and 
limits can only be discerned by the understanding."88 The belief in a nation-state 
reinforced by the legal recognition of this belief makes it practically real. 
Money is another example of an "artificial" and "fictional" institutional inven-
tion which is, objectively, merely some bits of more or less colorful paper or shiny 
pieces of metal (or symbolic representations on computer screens).89 Few, if any, 
would deny that money exists or amounts to "merely a legal fiction." The insti-
tutions of law, politics, and markets make the representation of "money" socially 
real, meaningful, and consequential. The same is true of the business firm, which 
the law creates, recognizes, and defines as a type of institutional "person" and 
"entity." 
Much ink has been spilled over concepts such as "legal fictions," "legal entities," 
and "legal persons." Unfortunately, as the likes of Hart and Dewey point out, these 
concepts have too often been used categorically to support one or another substan-
tive legal theory of the firm-or sometimes rejected entirely as unhelpful. Taking 
an institutional perspective allows one to explain and demystify these ideas, finding 
them both useful and descriptive, without either becoming a slave to the ideas or 
feeling a need to jettison them. 
2009), p. 71. The author qualifies this economic definition of the firm with the caveat that it "docs not 
necessarily coincide with a legal definition." Id. But it is acrnally closer to a foundational legal understand-
ing than most other economic definitions, allowing for legal variations in different circumstances with 
respect to participants included and legal strucrnres adopted. Sec also Raghuram G. Rajan and Luigi 
Zin gales, "Power in a Theory of the Firm," 113 Q1111rterly jo1m11d ofEco11omics 387 (1998); Raghuram 
G. Rajan and Luigi Zin gales, "The Firm as a Dedicated Hierarchy: A Theory of the Origi11s and Growth 
of Firms," 116 Q1111rterly journ11l of Economics 805 (2001). 
86 See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Commrmities: Reflections on the Origins 1111d Sprel1d of Ni1tio11-
11lism (Verso, 2nd ed., 2006). 
87 Arthur W. Machen, Jr., "Corporate Personality," 24 l!ttrVtml Lttw Review 346, 347 (I 91 I). 
88 Aviam Soifer, "Reviewing Legal Fictions," 20 Georgi,z L11w Review 871, 872 (1986) (quoting 
Tocqueville). 
89 For a discussion of the "social construction" of money as an "instirntio11al fact," see John Searle, 
1tJe Construction ofSocil1l Rel1lity (Free Press 1995), pp. 32-3, 41-3, 52-3, 63, 76, 79-81, 119. 
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Legal fictions 
To an average citizen, the idea of "legal fictions" may seem daunting or, worse, 
evidence of pettifoggery: the use of arcane legal concepts to achieve hidden, 
politically determined results by lawyers and those who hire them. A general 
theme in the history of jurisprudence has been to perceive legal fictions as prob-
lematic and unhelpful, obscuring the application of clear, scientific principles. 
Jeremy Bentham, for example, compared the use of fictions in law to swindling 
in trade. 90 And legal fictions can sometimes be used in this fashion. 
At the same time, the use of!egal fictions provides a means by which legal change 
can occur-pouring new wine of changing content into old legal bottles of 
established concepts.91 Lawyers use fictions all the time. In fact, it is often difficult 
to say when an idea transforms from a "legal fiction" into an established "legal 
truth." Even some of the most central legal ideas, such as a "contract," are fictional 
in the sense that the recognition of an enforceable promise (with consequences 
involving either judicial enforcement or the payment of money in damages) 
depends on the interpretation of legal sources of authority and the institutional 
invocation of this authority. One may say that natural "agreements" and "promises" 
occur through the use of language and human interaction.92 But it is law that 
determines whether a particular promise or agreement amounts to an enforceable 
"contract." A contract is therefore a legally determined social fact and an "artificial 
fiction." Over time, as the practice of making promises and enforcing contracts 
based on them becomes institutionally imbedded and relied upon in a particular 
culture, the fictional origins of the idea are forgotten as the concept becomes 
socially "real" through experience and settled cultural expectations. 
Another example of a legal fiction is the business corporation. One can describe 
corporations as "legal fictions" in the sense that they are invented (in general) and 
created (in specific instances) by human beings who use established legal methods 
and processes to do so. However, once a framework of corporate statutes has been 
established, and once specific business firms are up and running, the corporation as 
an institution is no longer a "mere fiction." It becomes socially real through its 
construction and maintenance in accordance with a specific set of internal and 
external legal rules, principles, and understandings. As one legal philosopher puts it, 
"very old fictions are no longer considered as such."93 Particularly useful legal 
fictions become converted over time into "juristic truth."94 
'JO Lon L. Fuller, leg11I Fictions (Stanford University Press 1967), p. 2 {citing Bentham). 
'JI See id., pp. 1-3 (discussing Bentham, I31ackstone, Jhering, and others). 
92 Sec, e.g., T.M. Scanlon, "Promises and Contracts," in The Theory of Contrttct law: New Ess11ys 
(Peter Benson ed.) (Cambridge University Press 2001), pp.86-117 {arguing that breaking promises 
and "lying promises" are morally wrong without regard to background legal institutions or likely 
enforcement). 
93 Pierre du Tourtoulon, Philosophy in the Development of l,1w (Macmillan 1922), quoted in Fuller, 
op. cit., p. 15 n. 36. 
'JI Fuller, op. cit., p. 23. 
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Policy debates may then arise concerning the principled foundations that sup-
port particular legal fictions such as a "contract" or a "corporation." In contract law, 
for example, the assertion of moral principle (keeping promises as a moral duty 
owed to people living in society together) may diverge from the assertion of 
economic principle (designing legal rules to achieve the greatest efficiency) as 
justifications for enforcing promises. 95 "Mixed theories" of ethics and efficiency 
can resolve or at least describe these kinds of normative conflicts.96 
At the same time, one should remember that legal fictions-even useful ones-
remain legal fictions. Therefore they remain open to the possibility of change. 
"A fiction becomes wholly safe," warns the legal scholar Lon Fuller, "only when it is 
used with a complete consciousness of its falsity." 97 Because ideas such as the 
"corporation" and other business forms are fictions, they arc also malleable. Again 
in Fuller's words: "Some fictions should be rejected; some should be redefined. 
Redefinition is proper where it results in the creation of a useful concept ... "98 Law 
defines business firms, and it can therefore re-define them. 
Legal fictions differ from literary fictions. The key difference is that legislatures 
and courts back legal fictions with institutional authority and, as a last resort, 
organized force.99 Yet there is nothing necessarily permanent about the adoption of 
a legal fiction. Legislatures and courts may dismantle, disregard, or reform legal 
fictions if and when they are no longer useful or no longer found to advance the 
social policies for which they were originally established. Again to follow Hart and 
Dewey, the legal fictions that designate the "entities" and "persons" of the business 
enterprise are not written in stone. Legal institutions invent and reinforce these 
fictions over time because they are found socially beneficial, and their continued use (1/ 
should then depend on whether they are working well or not. When a legal fiction 
is not working for the purposes intended, it should be either adapted or dis-
carded.100 
Law is not alone among the disciplines in using "fictions." Economics employs 
the fiction of the "rational actor." Political theorists and philosophers refer to 
imaginative "social contracts." And scientists employ theoretical constructs that 
are at least partly fictional or created imaginatively. IOI Lon Fuller, following the 
German philosopher Hans Vaihinger, asserts that conceptual fictions are even "an 
indispensable instrument of human thinking." 102 
95 See Stephen A. Smith, Commct Theory (Oxford University Press 2004), pp. 41-2, 106-19, 
140-58. 
96 kl., pp. 158-61. 
97 Fuller, op. cit., p. 10. 
'! 8 Id., p. 22. 
'J'J See Soifer, op. cit., pp. 882-3 (noting the difference and observing that "the nexus between even 
the most powerful literary fiction and actual force is quite attenuated"). 
10° For further discussion of the use and misuse oflegal fictions, sec Fuller, op. cit. See also Nancy 
J. Knauer, "Legal Fictions and Juristic Truth," 23 St. Thomas law Review 1 (2010). 
101 See Fuller, op. cit., pp. 98-110, 107. 
102 Id., pp. 93-123. But cf. Louise Harmon, "Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions and the Doctrine 
of Substituted Judgment," 100 Ytt!e lmv jormurl 1 (1990) (renewing concern about the misuse oflcgal 
fictions). 
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From this perspective, rhetorical references to business corporations as "Fran-
kenstein's monsters" may capture the truth of their artificial creation, but business 
firms in various legal forms are no more dangerous or unusual than other legal 
fictions, such as "contract" or "propercy." 103 Legal fictions can become socially 
embedded as institutions, and the resulting historical inertia and "path depend-
ence" can make change very difficult along many social dimensions. 104 The legal 
infrastructure of business enterprise engenders reliance and even economic depend-
ence of many participants on the "rules of the game." Appreciating the fictional 
features of business firms, however, allows one also to gain the critical perspective 
needed to reform them over time as social circumstances and needs change. Because 
the legal forms of business are fictions, they can be re-formed. 
On the topic of whether business firms of various kinds should be considered 
"fictional" or "real," one is tempted to follow the position taken by the legal theorist 
John Chipman Gray who noted an "old saying" chat "everybody is born either a 
nominalist or a realise." He concluded char it is unhelpful to argue for either point 
of view. 105 My view offers a different compromise, arguing chat the legal entities 
and persons known as business firms are best considered both "fictional" and"real." 
Institutional fictions become real over time through the social and legal practices 
that recognize them. This theoretical approach combines nominalism and realism. 
Understanding the firm as a "legal fiction" highlights the prerogatives of govern-
ment (including legislatures and courts) to change the legal forms of business 
enterprise, as well as the rules applicable to them when social conditions or relevant 
knowledge changes. Understanding the firm as "socially real" recognizes chat people 
participating in business build up interests and expectations over time and presume 
(with justifications chat the law often recognizes, respects, and enforces) chat the 
forms and rules relied upon will remain relatively stable, thus supplying solid 
institutional foundations for productive work and commerce. 
Legal entities 
From an institutional perspective, describing firms as "entities" is not problematic 
once one appreciates the flexibility of using legal fictions. "Entities" are artificial 
creations of the legal imagination. There is nothing strange or unusual in the use of 
IO.l For references to business corporations as Frankenstein's monsters, see Wormser, op. cit. See 
also Liggett v. lee, op. cit., 288 U.S. at 567 (Brandeis, J., dissenting in part). 
10·1 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Mark J. Roe, "A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate 
Ownership and Governance," 52 Stanford L,1w Review 127 (1999) (describing both "structure-driven" 
and "rule-driven" path dependence in institutional evolution). See also W. Brian Arthur, Increasing 
Ret11rns mu/ Path Dependence in the Economy (University of Michigan Press 1994); S.J. Liebowitz and 
Stephen E. Margolis, "Path Dependence, Lock-in, and History," 11 jo11rnal of Lmv, Economics, & 
Orga11iZt1tion 205 (1995); Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of 
Politics," 94 American Politiml Science Review 251 (2000); Stephen Redding, "Path Dependence, 
Endogenous Innovation, and Growth," 43 International Economic Review 1215 (2002). 
105 John Chipman Gray, The Nature anti Sources of the Law (Macmillan, 2nd ed., 1927), 
pp. 52-3. 
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entities to understand firms and how they work legally. One entity is the insti-
tutional "unity" of an enterprise such as a "corporation" (or an instantiated 
"body"). Considering the enterprise as an entity looks to the organizational coher-
ence of the management, decision processes, and operations of a business as a 
framework for legal thinking. 106 One might even go as far as Joseph Vining who 
argues: 
Entities, units of reference, building blocks may be essential to thought itself. ... A large part 
of thinking seems to consist of the rearranging or modifying of already given units of 
reference. But the establishment of a unit of reference is often the critical point in reasoning 
or discussion, legal or nonlegal, and when one is unpersuaded by an argument but does not 
quite know why, analysis often shows that one has tacitly rejected the unit of reference being 
used. 107 
Lon Fuller makes a similar argument: "[T]he notion of 'unity' or 'identity' has no 
meaning out of a complete context of thought-operations. 'Unity' and 'identity' are 
matters of subjective convenience. Conceptually one may postulate entities when-
ever it is convenient to do so." 108 For example, the creation and recognition of 
firms as legal entities gives them "standing" to sue and be sued in courts in their 
own (fictional) names. "Standing" is simply a legal term recognizing the ability of a 
legal person "to be heard by a judge." 109 
The "naming" of entities is another example of a "real fiction" used for individual 
humans (and often their pets) with application to business firms as well. A name is 
invented (by parents or bestowed through custom), and it then becomes "real"-as 
the name used to refer to the particular individual-through social practice, 
repetition, and reinforcement (e.g. the use of one's "name" in the family, in school, 
and on legal documents). Similarly, the naming of organizations occurs through the 
"naming devices" of corporate charters or partnership agreements-with the or-
ganizational name then reinforced as "real" through social practice, repetition, and 
reinforcement: such as through contracts in the firm's "name" used with employ-
ees, suppliers, customers, and creditors, as well as in the marketing of products and 
services by advertising and word-of-mouth. 110 
The legal conception of the firm as an entity also permits a defined and identified 
collective unit to hold and manage private property, to make contracts with people 
and other recognized entities, and to enforce or become the target of other legal 
responsibilities (including specific statutory capacities and obligations). Legal rec-
ognition of the business firm as an entity operationalizes the accounting concept of 
106 Sec Adolf A. Berle, Jr., "The Theory of Enterprise Entity," 47 Co!11111bi11 Law Review 343 
(1947). 
107 Vining, Legal Identity, op. cit., p. xii (original emphasis). 
108 Puller, op. cit., p. 120. 
io•J Vining, Legal Identity, op. cit., pp. 55-6 (reviewing the origin of the term). See also page 28 and 
accompanying note 83. 
110 On the deeper philosophy of naming, sec Saul A. Kripkc, Nmning mu! Necessity (Harvard 
University Press 1980). 
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a firm as having its own "fisc" and treasury. 111 Law creates an entity (jimza) that 
corresponds to the accounting entity (ragione) as well as the credit entity (ditta) .112 
This does not mean that modern legal and accounting entities are co-extensive. 
As discussed further below, especially in Chapters 2 and 6, the legal boundaries of 
the entities called firms vary according to the questions asked. Accounting bound-
aries, especially in corporate groups with parent-and-subsidiary or other complex 
organizational structures, can vary widely. For example, a firm may use overall 
consolidated accounting statements for U.S. income tax reporting purposes and, at 
the same time, use separate subsidiary profit-and-loss statements or other account-
ing methods to manage subordinate business units within a larger firm structure. 
Legal determinations are often required to determine the appropriate "enterprise 
entity" in resolving particular questions and cases. 113 For example, a common 
thread in some turn-of-the-century financial scandals in the United States (includ-
ing those involving Enron's implosion and Goldman Sachs' enabling of a hedge 
fund short in the housing market), involved the highly creative and legally ques-
tionable use of off-balance sheet accounting "entities" for various kinds of transac-
tions.114 The simpler point here is that a foundational concept of the firm as a legal 
entity is necessary for these kinds of questions even to arise (and then to be 
answered). 
In addition, the designation of an entity is important for recognizing responsi-
bility for harmful actions or, in legal terms, "liability." Business participants may 
use legal entities to limit their liability, perhaps most notably through legal policies 
favoring limited liability for the shareholders and creditors of corporations. Com-
mentators sometimes focus too closely on the limits to personal liability extended co 
shareholders (and managers). 115 Creditors who finance business entities through 
arms-length contracts also enjoy limited liability for the potentially harmful actions 
of the firms to whom they lend-as long as they do not assume effective managerial 
control of the enterprises that they finance. 116 
111 For a review of the importance of accounting in this connection, see Orts, "A Short History of 
the Business Enterprise," op. cit. For discussion of accounting concepts with respect to the delineation 
of the business firm, see also Kenneth S. Most, "Sombart's Propositions Revisited," 47 Accounting 
Review 722 (I 972); Basil S. Yamey, "Accounting and the Rise of Capitalism: Further Notes on a 
Theme by Sombart," 2 Journal of Accormting Research l 17 (1964); James 0, Winjum, "Accounting 
and the Rise of Capitalism: An Accountant's View," 9 ]011rnt1! of Accormting Rese,trch 333 (1971). 
112 Werner Sornbart, "Medieval and Modern Commercial Enterprise," in Enterprise and Sec11!t1r 
Change: Re11dings in Economic History (Frederic C. Lane ed.) (Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1953), p. 31. See 
also Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of Bwiness Enterprise (Mentor 1932) (1904), pp. 49-67 (discussing 
"loan credit" as an important feature of business enterprise). 
113 See, e.g., Berle, op. cit., pp. 348-50 (discussing the example of determining the appropriate 
"entity" in parent-subsidiary cases with reference to consolidating accounting statements as a guide for 
legal results). 
111 See Bratton and Levitin, op. cit. 
115 See, e.g., Berle, op. cit., p. 343 (1947) (noting that the "primary business advantage" of the 
corporation is the "insulation of individual stockholders composing the corporation from liability for 
the debts of the corporate enterprise," as well as "the distribution of responsibility" among corporate 
managers and officers). 
116 For a classic case illustrating a sicuation where a creditor becomes liable to third parties for 
exercising managerial control under agency law, see A. G11y Jenson F11rms Co. v. C11rgill, Inc., 309 
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The concept of "asset partitioning" helps to explain the use of the legal entity in 
limiting the liability and risk of capital providers. Essentially, the recognition of the 
firm as an entity and the firm's ability to own assets in its own name allow for 
setting financial priorities between creditors and equity owners for claims on these 
designated assets. The legal entity of the firm may also "shield" creditors and equity 
owners from personal liability in some circumstances. 117 According to the legal 
scholars Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kcaakman, there are two general types of 
asset partitioning. "Affirmative asset partitioning" refers to a priority that creditors of 
the firm are given to the assets dedicated to the firm and owned by the firm as an 
entity. In the event of financial trouble, the creditors of the firm get priority over 
both the equity owners of the firm and any personal creditors of the equity owners. 
For example, if a single firm with a single owner has assets of $1 million, and the 
owner goes personally bankrupt, then the creditors of the firm can make claims 
against the $1 million dedicated to the firm ahead of claims made against the owner 
personally. "Defensive asset partitioning" refers to an entity "shield" chat is recog-
nized to protect the equity owners of the finn from personal liability for claims made 
against chem by creditors of the firm in excess of a firm's own dedicated assets. 118 
Adapting the previous example, imagine that the single firm with designated assets 
of $1 million produces defective products that result in a liability of $5 million. 
A corporate entity will "shield" the owner's personal assets against claims exceeding 
the $1 million amount invested in the firm. 
Taking advantage oflegal "asset partitioning," the creditors and shareholders of a 
corporate enterprise put only the amount of funds invested in the corporation at 
risk: they do not usually have to worry about additional liability for harms or 
obligations that may exceed the amount of capital owned by the corporation in the 
event of financial failure or bankruptcy. And creditors enjoy some security of a first 
claim on a firm's dedicated assets. Different business forms, which arc further 
described in Chapter 5, allow for more or less protection in terms of the legal 
strength of "partitioned" assets in an entity. 119 
There are exceptions to this rule of limited liability even with respect to corpor-
ations, which are usually thought to provide the strongest form of asset partition-
ing.120 (Criteria that justify exceptions to permit "piercing the entity" to find 
N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 1981). Agency law and limited liability arc further discussed in Chapters 2 
and 4. 
117 See Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, "The Essential Role of Organizational Law," 110 
Yale Lmu journal 387 (2000). 
118 Id., pp. 393-6; see also Paul G. Mahoney, "Contract or Concession? An Essay on the 1-1 istory of 
Corporate Law," 34 Georgia Law Review 873, 876-7 (2000) (referring to the same idea as "forward" 
and "reverse" partitioning). In work with another author, Hansmann and Kraakman substitute "entity 
shielding" for "affirmative asset partitioning." Hansmann, Kraakman, and Squire, op. cit., pp. 1362-3. 
119 Hansmann and Kraakman, "The Essential Role of Organizational Law," op. cit., pp. 394-7. 
120 Sec, e.g., Berle, op. cit., pp. 352-4 (reviewing cases disregarding corporate entities when used 
for illegal, fraudulent, or "objectionable" purposes); Clark, op. cit., pp. 35-92 (describing "limits to 
limited liability" for shareholders, such as in fraudulent conveyance law and "piercing the corporate 
veil" cases); Conard, op. cit., pp. 424-3 (reviewing various criteria for exceptions to limited liability); 
Franklin A. Gcvurtz, Corpomtion Law (West Group 2000), pp. 69-111 (same). 
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liability are discussed in Chapter 4.) One can achieve the legal results of asset 
partitioning, however, only by recognizing and respecting the "entity" of a business 
enterprise. Other legal methods of asset partitioning are not feasible, mostly for 
reasons of transaction costs in terms of the extensive contracting that would be 
otherwise required. 121 
Joseph Vining is therefore on the mark when he writes: "Limitation of the 
liability that would otherwise flow from private law analysis-the limitation that is 
a characteristic feature of modern industrial and commercial organization-is 
largely the recognition and separation of entities." 122 Hansmann and Kraakman 
conclude also that the recognition of entities is "essential" for the organization of 
business enterprise. 123 
More broadly speaking, the designation of firms as entities raises questions of 
their governance, decision-making authority, and control. Many issues in the law of 
enterprise organization involve "the recognition of entity" with respect to these 
dimensions as well. 124 In contrast to some contemporary authors who treat the idea 
of firms as entities strictly from an economic perspective, Vining observes that 
attributes of "power" and "authority" are involved as well as "wealth" whenever 
dealing with "entities beyond the material or individually human." 125 
Some legal complexities and difficulties arise in terms of different kinds of 
entities that may possess more or less economic or social "reality." For example, 
corporate subsidiaries are recognized as legal entities and used in the structures of 
holding companies and large multinational enterprises. 126 (Historically, there was 
resistance to the idea that corporations or other business enterprises such as trusts 
should be allowed to hold stock in other corporations or entities, but these kinds of 
multi-entity corporate groups became solidly established over time and "grew to 
occupy a commanding role in American industry and eventually in the world 
economy as well." 127) These legally complex enterprises are usually managed in a 
relatively centralized fashion. 128 Toyota, for example, exercises relatively unified 
management control of its business from its central headquarters in Japan, even 
though it has also created a number oflegal entities as subsidiaries for manufacturing 
and sales operations in other locations, such as the United States. 129 Multinational 
121 Hansmann and Kraakman, "The Essential Role of Organizational Law," op. cit., pp. 406-23. 
122 Joseph Vining, From Newton's Sleep (Princeton University Press 1995), p. 320. 
12.l Hansmann and Kraakman, "The Essential Role of Organizational Law," op. cit., pp. 387, 
390, 440. 
124 Vining, From Newton's Sleep, op. cit., p. 320. 
125 Id., pp. 319-20. 
126 See, e.g., Conard, op. cit., pp. 165-9; Eric W. Ores, "The Legitimacy of Multinational 
Enterprise," in Progressive Corpomte Lt1w (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed.) (Westview Press 1995), 
pp. 248-9, 251-2. 
127 Blumberg, op. cit., p. 58. 
128 However, there arc exceptions. Corporate conglomerates and other business firms, for example, 
arc sometimes managed in a purposefully decentralized manner in order to devolve operational 
decision-making authority in the firm to lower managerial levels in the organization. 
12'J See, e.g., Rene !3elderbos and Leo Sleuwaegen, "Japanese Firms and the Decision to Invest 
Abroad: !3usincss Groups and Regional Core Networks," 78 Review of Economics mul Statistics 214, 
216 (1996). 
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business enterprise structures thus raise interesting issues of "corporate geog-
raphy." 130 
Corporate law in most jurisdictions recognizes subsidiaries as useful entities for 
various purposes, such as establishing domestic corporate residence or citizenship 
for doing business and limiting the extent of liability for the corporate parenc. 13 1 
Policy justifications for this extension of limited liability to parent-subsidiary and 
other complex entity structures may include the encouragement of international 
trade as well as flexibility for larger firms to enter into new corporate ventures with 
different combinations of investors. The "primary motives" for parent-subsidiary 
structures may also include: "increased facility in financing; the desire to escape the 
difficulty, if not the impossibility, of qualifying the parent company as a foreign 
corporation in a particular state; the avoidance of complications involved in the 
purchase of physical assets; the retention of the good will of an established business 
unit; the avoidance of taxation; the avoidance of cumbersome management struc-
tures; [and] the desire for limited liability." 132 Parent-subsidiary corporations often 
create entity-within-entity structures, however, which go beyond policy justifica-
tions of "asset partitioning" to protect individual participants. Strong arguments 
have been made that courts and legislarors should subject parent-subsidiary and 
other entity-within-entity structures to greater scrutiny when they are invoked to 
limit the liabiliry for harm caused by a larger enterprise and attributable to decisions 
made for the benefit of the participants in the larger business as a whole. This 
approach would follow an "enterprise entity" or "single enterprise" theory for 
finding liability. 133 
Jurisdictional issues are also important when considering whether and when 
to extend liability to corporate parents. These issues arise both at the national 
and global levels. 134 And questions of "piercing the entity" in parent-subsidiary 
I .lo For an introduction to the field, sec Richard Walker, "A Requiem for Corporate Geography: 
New Directions in Industrial Organization, the Production of Place and the Uneven Development," 
71 Geogmjisl?ti Anna/er: Series B, 1!111111111 Geogmphy 43 (1989). 
1.ll Sec, e.g., Blumberg, op. cit., pp. 58-60 (recognizing limited liability in parent-subsidiary 
structures but noting that it appears to have evolved as "a historical accident"); Orts, "The Legitimacy 
of Multinational Enterprise," op. cit., pp. 254-8 (reviewing the use of subsidiaries for purposes of 
establishing corporate citizenship in different jurisdictions). 
1.12 William 0. Douglas and Carrol M. Shanks, "Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary 
Corporations," 39 Yale Lmu ]011n111! 193, 193 (1929). 
l.l.l See, e.g., Berle, op. cit.; Conard, op. cit., pp. 428-9; Douglas and Shanks, op. cit., pp. 210, 
217-18; Note, "Liability of a Corporation for Acts of a Subsidiary or Affiliate," 71 Harvard Law 
Review 1122 (1958). See also Robert J. Rhee, "Bonding Limited Liability," 51 William and M11ry Law 
Review 1417, 1456-8 (2010) (favoring a "theory of enterprise liability" determined by a practical 
"control" test). But sec, e.g., Stephen B. Presser, Piercing the Corporate Veil (Clark, Boardman, 
Callaghan I 992), pp. 1-53 to 1-57 (arguing that economic principles justify extending limited liability 
to corporate parents); Stephen B. Presser, "The Bogalusa Explosion, 'Single Business Enterprise,' 'Alter 
Ego,' and Other Errors: Academics, Economics, Democracy, and Shareholder Limited Liability," 100 
Northwestern University Law Review 405, 420-7 (2006) (rejecting "single enterprise" and other 
theories of parent liability). 
1.14 Sec, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, "Unlimited Shareholder Liability Thrnugh a Procedural 
Lens," 106 l-ftzrVtlrt! Law Review 387 (1992); Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, "A Procedural 
Focus on Unlimited Shareholder Liability," 106 H,zrv,m! I.aw Review 446 (1992); Jennifer 
A. Schwartz, Comment, "Piercing the Corporate Veil of an Alien Parent for Jurisdictional Purposes: 
) 
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situations arise also in bankruptcy law. 135 The point here is not to resolve all of 
these complex legal questions, but only to point out that the recognition of business 
"entities" is essential in all of them. 
Another example shows how a legal entity can have virtually no "real" insti-
tutional existence at all. In triangular mergers in the United States-a legal 
procedure by which three corporate entities are used to merge or consolidate two 
companies-a new legal entity is often created as a subsidiary in order to accom-
plish the merger. The newly formed entity then simply disappears after the merger 
is concluded. For example, a target corporation X may be merged into a subsidiary 
Y of an acquiring corporation Z. Once merged into subsidiary Y, target X as a 
separate entity is dissolved, leaving only corporation Zand its subsidiary Y. (See 
Figure 1.1 for a schematic representation.) The reality of the third entiry here 
appears only formally in the law's imagination-a fiction that is nevertheless useful 
to accomplish the practical ends of the two primary institutional players (namely, X 
and Z corporations). 136 The transient and ephemeral nature of the entity used to 
achieve a triangular merger suggests one reason to avoid adopting a real entity 
institutional theory as complete. 137 As long as this method of corporate combin-
ation accomplishes objectives that are otherwise deemed effective, fair, and sound as 
a matter of public policy, however, there appears to be no reason to fear the use of 
fictional legal entities in this fashion. 138 
A Proposal for a Standard That Comports with Due Process," 96 Cttliforni,z Lt1w Review 731 (2008); 
William A. Voxman, Comment, "Jurisdiction over a Parent Corporation in Its Subsidiary's Seate of 
Incorporation," 141 University of Pennsylvt1ni,1 Lt1w Review 327 (I 992). 
135 For a classic debate on this ropic, see Jonathan M. Landers, "A Unified Approach to Parent, 
Subsidiary, and Affiliate Questions in Bankruptcy," 42 University of Chicago Lt1w Review 589 (1975); 
Jonathan M. Landers, "Another Word on Parents, Subsidiaries and Affiliates in Bankruptcy," 43 
University of Chict1go Lt1w Review 527 (1976); Richard A. Posner, "The Rights of Creditors of Affiliated 
Corporations," 43 University of Chict1go Lt1w Review 499 (1976). See also Richard Squire, "Strategic 
Liability in the Corporate Group," 78 University of Chict1go Lmv Review 605 (2011) (revisiting this 
debate in light of current practices). 
IJG For explanation of triangular mergers, see Clark, op. cit., pp. 430-3 (summarizing reasons for 
them, including avoiding liability, avoiding shareholder votes that may otherwise be required, and tax 
considerations). See also Klein, Coffee, and Parcnoy, op. cit., pp. 120-2. 
137 This refers co the overly strong versions of an "institutional entiry theory" such as adopted by 
Gierke. See pages 15-16 and accompanying notes 27-8. See also Otto von Gierke, Community in 
flistoric,tl Perspective (Mary Fischer trans., Antony Black ed.) (Cambridge University Press, 1990) 
(1868); Otto von Gierke, Political Theories of the Middle Age (Frederick Maitland trans.) (Cambridge 
University Press 1987) (1913). 
l.lB Klein, Coffee, and Parcnoy use the triangular merger example in contradistinction to their 
argument against what they call the "reification" of the business enterprise. Influenced strongly by 
economic models of the firm, these scholars argue against the use of reification (or the recognition of 
a business as an entity) for analytical purposes "except when the complexity of the actual relation-
ships becomes so unmanageable as to make it necessary co reify." Klein, Coffee, and Partnoy, op. cit., 
p. 117. I agree that chis analytical perspective with its focus on individual business participants is 
useful, but I disagree with it to the extent that this view seems to reject recognition of legal persons 
and entities as descriptive concepts and sees them as unfortunate "exceptions" rather than as basic 
concepts needed for understanding ofche business enterprise as an institution. See id., pp. 117-18. 
See also G. Micu Gulati, William A. Klein, and Eric M. Zolt, "Connected Contracts," 47 UCLA Lmv 
ReviellJ 887, 890-3 (2000) (arguing against "reification" and the use of"entities" in legal analysis of 
firms and adopting a version of the economic "nexus of contracts" theory of the firm, which essentially 
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A third example of the use of legal entities refers to options for the "form-
shifting" of business enterprises or, more colorfully, their propensity for "shape-
shifting." 139 Given a menu of different legal options (which are reviewed further in 
Chapter 5 below), a firm can "shapeshift" from one form to another in terms of its 
governance structure (e.g. from a partnership to a corporation) and capital structure 
(e.g. from a closely held corporation with only a few shareholders to a publicly held 
corporation with many shareholders). Corporate shapeshifting, as the legal scholar 
Frank Partnoy describes the phenomenon, is "a transformation of corporate form 
involving the creation or use of a new legal entity and one or more changes in 
structure, including capital structure and the allocation of control rights." 1~0 
Business forms other than corporations can also shapeshift-including, for 
example, sole proprietorships, partnerships, or limited liability companies trans-
forming into corporations (or vice versa). The general "choice of business form" 
problem for a start-up enterprise is only an initial choice and can be later altered. 
One basic option includes an initial decision to "incorporate" as a small start-up 
business to gain various legal advantages. More complex transactions can include a 
decision to "go private," that is, when a large corporation with many public 
shareholders changes into a privately held corporation (often accomplished with 
the assistance of private equity firms which specialize in the performance of this sort 
of legal and financial alchemy). Or a firm may decide to use "special purpose 
entities" for capital accounting purposes. 141 Part110y includes "public company 
regulatory arbitrage" by hedge funds and the use of various financial techniques to 
change a firm's capital structure as additional examples of corporate shapeshifting. 
denies the usefulness of the concept of a firm as an entity). I contest the "connected contracts" thesis in 
Chapter 2. 
IJ'J Frank Partnoy, "Shapeshifting Corporations," 76 University of Chimgo Law Review 26 I (2009). 
1·10 Id., p. 262. 
141 Sec id., pp. 264-6. 
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These techniques often use newly formed and legally recognized entities for these 
changes, such as "special purpose entities" and "structured finance." 142 These kinds 
of special entities have recently come under sustained legal fire as essentially 
fraudulent to the extent that they are used to misrepresent the true lines of 
economic control and responsibility in particular transactions. 143 
Whether different kinds of shapeshifting transactions should be legally allowed 
or encouraged requires an appeal to policy considerations, such as whether they are 
fairly done (with respect to the treatment of various business participants) and 
whether they contribute to overall social welfare. As Partnoy observes, it is not self-
evident chat the constant and often rapid shapeshifting of legal entities provides 
economic value to society as a whole or whether it often functions instead as a 
method co enrich some business participants at the expense of others. As Parmoy 
observes: "On one hand, shapeshifting can reflect the efficiency of markets as 
corporate structures move to their most highly valued shape .... On the other 
hand, shapeshifting can reflect the extraction of private value or the transaction 
costs associated with inefficient legal rules." 144 In particular, there is good reason to 
be skeptical of"cydical shapeshifting"-such as a pattern of going public through 
an initial public offering, then going private, then going public again, et cetera. 145 
Repeated or frequent shapeshifting may indicate wealth transfers among different 
groups within a firm rather than building long-term economic value for all 
participants and society as a whole. At least, the ability to make these kinds of 
changes in business structures illustrates another instance of the importance of 
"entities" (and accounting for them) in a legal theory of the firm. 
Legal persons 
If the conception of business firms as artificial and fictional ennnes may seem 
relatively passive or abstract-described in terms of accounting-like "partitions" of 
assets and legalistic manipulation of entities to achieve various business purposes-
then thinking of firms as "legal persons" adds an active and more energetic quality 
to a legal theory of the firm. Legal personality brings the somewhat abstract ideas of 
firms as "fictions" and "entities" back to practical reality. As Joseph Vining explains, 
the "problem of legal persons" is a subset of the "larger problem" involving the 
"process of defining and designating entities." 146 
Again, there is nothing to fear in the ensuing legal discussions concerning what 
"persons" and "entities" to recognize. The legal work of "communicating and 
agreeing" about the recognition of legal persons is constandy "shifting and 
changing" and "is as common as it is fascinating." 147 Authoritative "restatements" 
and "summaries" of law in the United States support a broad view of the recogni-
tion of "persons." The American Law Institute in its Principles of Corporate 
142 Id., pp. 266-9, 283-7. 143 See Bratton and Levitin, op. cit. 
141 Partnoy, op. cit., pp. 287-8 145 Id., pp. 269-70, 278. 
146 Vining, legttl Identity, op. cit., p. xii. 147 Id. 
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Governance adopts the following broad definition: '"Person' means (a) an individ-
ual, (6) any form of organization, including a corporation, a partnership or any 
other form of association, any form of trust or estate, a government or any political 
subdivision, or an agency or instrumentality of government, or (c) any other legal or 
commercial entity." 148 Similarly, the American Law lnstitute's Restatement (Third) 
of Agency defines "person" to include any "organization or association" or "other 
legal entity that has legal capacity to possess rights and incur obligations." 149 
Business firms are not mere disembodied entities but rather collective groups of 
"people in action." 150 Thinking of the firm as a legal person animates it with the 
ability to exercise power and authority through human representatives. The repre-
sentatives of firms include those given the ordinary everyday power and authority to 
make decisions, namely, managers, officers, and directors. In the United States, the 
"business judgment rule" bestows significant discretion to corporate managers and 
direcrors to exercise independent decision-making authority on a wide range of 
decisions under ordinary circumstances. 151 Other countries also allow for a similar 
delegation of broad authority to managers and directors of firms. 152 
Basic founding documents, such as partnership agreements and corporate char-
ters, combine with authorizing legislation, such as partnership laws and corporation 
codes, to provide the legal pillars for the institutional "persons" of firms. 153 Usually, 
managers and executives speak for the person of the firm. Depending on the 
circumstances, other groups can also speak for the interests of the firm: creditors 
in the case of bankruptcy or shareholders in the case of fundamental disputes 
regarding major changes in business structure or challenges to managers' or direct-
ors' decisions, or protection of their voting rights. With some exceptions, however, 
creditors do not represent firms, and the protection of their interests is limited to 
contracts made directly with the managers and designated leaders of the firm. (In 
bankruptcy, the situation changes because creditors are given priority in terms of 
governance and distribution of assets in case of liquidation or reorganization.) Also, 
shareholders do not represent firms, unless the percentage size of their financial 
stake gives them effective control (such as in some closely held corporations), in 
which case the majority shareholders are effectively also the managers. Sharehold-
ers of large public corporations usually have a role in corporate governance 
limited to selecting a board of directors and exercising oversight through access 
to corporate records and, in some cases, bringing derivative litigation in the name 
148 American Law lnstimte, Principles of Corpomte Govemt111ce: A1111lysis llllrl Recomme11d,11io11s 
(I 994), sect. 1.28. 
149 American Law lnstitlltc, Restatement (Third) of Agency (2006), sect. 1.04(5). 
150 Conard, op. cit., pp. 442-5. 
151 Sec, e.g., Clark, op. cit., pp. 123-5; Klein, Coffee, and Partnoy, op. cir., pp. 156-61. 
152 Other countries have adopted the equivalent of the business judgment rule. Sec Klaus J. Hope, 
"Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and International Regulation," 59 A111eri-
c1111 Journill ofCompamtive Lllw !, 39-40 (201 I) (noting adoption of the rule by judicial decision or 
statlltc in Germany, Switzerland, Japan, and Australia). 
15.l See Restt1tement (Third) of Agency, op. cit., sect. 1.03, cmt. c (observing that authority within 
business firms "originates both with the statute through which the organization achieves a legally 
recognized form and with the organization's constitutional documents"). 
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of the corporation challenging actions of directors or officers as violations of their 
corporate duties. 154 In almost all everyday situations, then, executives and other 
managers represent the firm as a person. Firms as legal persons-composed 
(almost always) of collectively owned assets and teams of people who work 
together-gain social meaning and reality through the actions of their representa-
tives. 
Firms of any significant size and complexity depend, then, on their executive 
leadership. The leaders of firms express their organizational purposes, set their 
objectives, and represent the firm's collectively organized interests. 155 In complex 
firms with some degree of hierarchical organization, leadership is a quality that can 
be exercised in a bottom-up as well as a top-down manner. 156 (This assertion that 
leaders express a firm's purposes and objectives is subject to the caveat, however, 
that the firm's founding documents or "private legislation" can define and limit 
these purposes and objectives. Although firms depend on leaders to represent them, 
leaders would have nothing to represent without a foundational recognition of the 
firm as an organizational legal person. And internal "constitutional" limitations on 
leadership authority and power can be included in the founding documents of a 
firm.) 
Understanding the firm as a legal person with human representatives that speak 
and act on its behalf reflects common sense as well as traditional legal interpret-
ations. Presidents and prime ministers lead nation-states. Generals lead armies. 
Deans and principals lead schools. Although it is true that leaders of organizational 
persons represent the interests of other human beings who compose the collective 
entity, it is also true that these leaders speak, in their leadership roles, on behalf of 
the legal person itself-representing the organizational entity. The idea of business 
representation and leadership does not depart from this general pattern. Chief 
executive officers lead corporations. Managing partners lead law and accounting 
firms. Strictly speaking, it is difficult if not impossible to imagine a country, an 
army, a school, or a business firm without some embodiment of a leader or a 
leadership group. Leaders represent organizational legal persons. Each of them is 
delegated responsibility for advancing the purposes and speaking on behalf of the 
organizational "entity." Business firms are no different than any other organization 
in this respect, except that they specialize in commerce. 
The selection of leadership for organizations also implicates governance struc-
tures. Here it is sufficient to observe that the governance structures of private 
organization are open for significant variation selected by the major business 
participants (such as the founding owners writing a corporate charter) in contrast 
15·1 See Principles of Corporttte Governance, op. cit., sects. 3.01, 3.02, 5. I 0, 7.0 I co 7.17 (describing 
roles of managers, directors, and controlling shareholders, as well as shareholder derivative lawsuits). 
155 For a classical treatment of institutional leadership in a manner consistent with the account of 
firms given here, see Philip Selznick, Leadership in Administrtttion: A Sociologiet1! Interpretation 
(University of California Press 1958). 
156 Sec, e.g., Michael Useem, Leading Up: How to Lead Your Boss So You Both W'in (Crown Business 
2003) (discussing strategies for leadership from within an organization aimed a higher levels). 
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to the governance structures of nation-states (such as the U.S. Constitution). These 
variations of legal forms of firms are further examined in Chapter 5. 
The social theory of Thomas Hobbes provides useful insights with respect to the 
idea of legal personality and its practical representation in the world. For Hobbes, 
corporations (or, in his day, "merchant companies") as well as commonwealths are 
"made by words." 157 They do not exist except through human speech, language, 
and action. In fact, legal persons of all kinds do not exist, according to Hobbes, in 
any a priori sense. For Hobbes, language precedes the naming of persons. Arguably, 
this view fits with a number of other legal categorizations of persons-such as the 
difference between "citizens" and "aliens" (based on nationality claims). This view 
fits also with strongly fictional versions of legal personality, that is, those that 
maintain that law can designate almost anything as a "legal person." 1 58 On this 
view, a legal person is entirely dependent on law for its existence. If one takes away 
the law that defines a legal person, "there is no more left than the smile of the 
Cheshire Cat after the cat had disappeared." 159 
Even narural individual human beings, the foundational "persons" recognized in 
the bottom-up participant theories of the firm, are created through speech, lan-
guage, and social action. (In contrast, the persons assumed in economic versions of 
participant theories of the firm are usually radically undertheorized. The individuals 
assumed in methodological individualism are often mere ciphers. 160) For Hobbes, 
"persons are essentially spokespersons who can give their word to others and 
thereby 'personate' themselves." 161 The ability to speak a language is one prerequis-
ite. The ability to reason is another. 162 Human beings who speak and reason have 
the coincident ability to "personate" and represent themselves to other human 
beings. 
This view corresponds to a contemporary philosophical view that would restrict 
reference to "legal persons" only to rational, communicative human beings. 163 
Etymology supports this interpretation as well. In Latin, personrl refers to "a 
theatrical mask." Its roots are from per meaning "through" and sonare meaning 
"sound." 164 A "person," then, represents himself or herself to others through 
sound, speech, and language. 
157 See Philip Pettit, M11de with Words: Hobbes on L11ng1111ge, Mind, ,md Politics (Princeton 
University Press 2008), pp. 70-81, 115-16. 
158 For a review of current approaches in this vein, see Ngaire Nafline, "Who arc Law's Persons? 
From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects," 66 Modem Lmv Review 346, 350-4 (2003). 
159 Id., p. 353, quoting Bryant Smith, "Legal Personality," 37 Y11le L,110 Journal 283, 294 (1928). 
160 See Note, "What We Talk About When We Talk Abouc Persons: The Language of a Legal 
!.:iction,",, 114 '.I,1:,v111d Law Review_171,5, 1768 (2001) (obscrv!ng that l~g:11 discussions about 
persons remam grossly undertheonzed ). But sec Nafline, op. cit. (categormng current legal and 
philosophical theories of "legal persons"). 
161 Pettit, op. cit., p. 2 (describing Hobbes' "theory of personhood"). 
162 Id., pp. 24-54, 141, 144-6. 
163 See Naffine, op. cit., pp. 362-5 (citing proponents of this view including Michael Moore and 
Elizabeth Wolgast). 
IM Pettit, op. cit., p. 59. But see Max Radin, "The Endless Problem of Corporate Personality," 32 
Col11mbit1 Law Review 643, 645-7 (1932) (agreeing with this etymology but arguing that "person" is 
used more commonly in the modern sense of"a human being"). Following Dewey, Radin argues for a 
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So-called "dumb" animals are not ordinarily considered persons in this sense 
because they do not have capacity for language and reason (though they may speak 
and communicate in a more rudimentary fashion, e.g. dogs barking or cats 
meowing). 165 Babies, young children, and severely mentally ill or incapacitated 
human beings arguably fall into the same category. In Hobbes' words, "children, 
fools, and madmen" are excluded from the ability to act as "natural" persons. 166 
However, if animals, incapacitated or immature people, and other "entities" (such 
as fetuses or even frozen embryos) are deemed to have basic legal rights (such as the 
right not to be treated cruelly or the right to inherit property), then these rights can 
be "represented" by full-capacity human beings who can use language as well as 
rational thought. Like firms or other organizational legal persons, animals and 
incapacitated or immature human beings can gain status as "legal persons" through 
the representation of capable human beings who can exercise language, reasoning, 
and legal argument on their behalf. 167 
The next step is the representation of a collective person-not of oneself (or an 
animal or incapacitated human being), but rather the representation of a collective 
group of people. For Hobbes, this representation is accomplished in a participant-
based process. 168 The creation of a collective person is enabled by "rallying behind 
the words of a collective representative or spokesperson." 169 This is the origin, for 
Hobbes, of "the ability of people to incorporate-to come together and act as a 
single corporate [or other organizational] person." 170 The philosopher Philip Pettit 
nicely describes these two steps as "using words to personate" (that is, for people to 
represent themselves through language, thought, and communication in society) 
and "using words to incorporate" (that is, the ability for people to create and 
represent collective organizations). 171 The use of "corporation" here is used in a 
general rather than a technical legal sense referring to a specific modern business 
form. The corportio (corporation) as distinguished from a congregatio (congregation) 
refers to an organizational entity that "exists, in a sense, over and beyond its 
members," but nevertheless "needs members to speak and act for it." When 
representatives of a corportio do so-"when people act in that role"-"they put 
aside their own identities." They become rmiversi (representatives) in this role and 
"cease to perform as singuli or individuals." 172 On this view, the construction of 
organized "legal perso'ns" beyond the singly speaking, reasoning human being 
pragmatic use of"corporate personality" as "a matter of necessity and convenience," while recognizing 
its "nominalist," flexible character. Id., pp. 652, 665-7, citing Dewey, op. cit. 
165 Pettit, op. cit., p. 60. 
166 Id., p. 56 (quoting Hobbes). 
167 See also Naffine, op. cit., pp. 357-6 I, 365-7. 
168 For a contrary philosophical view that collective organizations precede the individual human 
being in terms of the ontological creation of"persons," see Roger Scruton and John Finnis, "Corporate 
Persons," 63 Proceedings of the Aristote!i,111 Society, Supplementary Volumes 239 (1989). In my view, this 
philosophical disagreement recapitulates, though at a deeper level, the theoretical debate about whether 
the recognition of firms begins as a "bottom-up" or "top-down" process. Perhaps the best answer is the 
institmional one given here of "both." 
IG'! Pettit, op. cit., p. 2 (describing Hobbes' "theory of group agency"), 
170 Id., p. 70. 171 Id., pp. 55-81. 172 Id., p. 70. 
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becomes possible through a secondary institutional process of representation and 
the legal recognition of groups. 
One does not have to accept the deeper philosophical claims that Hobbes 
makes about the nature of language and meaning to agree with his points about 
legal personality and organization. Just as human beings can through language 
and reason "personate" themselves, they can by the same means "personatc" or 
represent collective groups. These groups can be public (such as the Hobbesian 
Leviathan of the sovereign political state). Or they can be private, including 
business firms, as well as nonprofit organizations with educational, religious, 
political, philanthropic, or other social objectives. Fundamentally, these "group 
persons" cannot exist without some form of legal representation or "personifica-
tion." 173 
Rather than a misty obfuscation that prevents clear analysis of the component 
parts of firms, then, legal personality is an essential component of any realistic legal 
theory of the firm. An attribution oflegal personality is needed for business firms 
to have social meaning: not only with respect to procedural abilities to exert 
"standing" in courts, but also practical abilities to conduct ordinary, everyday 
transactions through representatives-or, in legal terms, "agents"-by means 
of contracts, through the instrumentalities of private property, and within the 
constraints imposed by the organization's own internal rules and society's external 
laws. 
The concept of legal persons acting through designated representatives raises 
important issues of governance and formulation of "collective purpose." Govern-
ance of firms refers to the operation of both (1) voluntary, internally imposed rules 
created by founding documents and other agreements made by business partici-
pants (such as corporate charters and bylaws); and (2) externally imposed legal rules 
(such as the requirement that a large public corporation must have a board of 
directors). These governance rules allow for the firm to act as an "organizational 
principal" and to delegate authority to managers and its other "agents." (Recogni-
tion of organizational principals and the role of agents arc also foundational for a 
legal theory of the firm as discussed in detail in Chapter 2.) 
The idea of a "collective purpose" or "collective intention" of an organizational 
person does not refer to metaphysical versions of a "general will." In a practical 
sense, these ideas refer only to the rules set in place by voluntary organizational 
agreements (such as charters or bylaws) and external law (including statutes and 
court decisions), as well as the expressions made by representatives exercising their 
authority according to these rules and practices. Leaders, managers, and other 
agents who are delegated governance authority through these procedures possess 
a recognized ability to speak, act, and otherwise communicate on behalf of the firm. 
Notions of collective purpose or collective intention of business firms-and the 
methods used to ascertain them-deserve further attention from legal scholars. 
A resurgence of general interest in these topics has occurred in philosophy, 
17.I For an examination of "group persons" in chis "juristic" sense, see Andrew Vincent, "Can 
Groups Ik Persons?" 42 Review of Metaphysics 687, 704-12 (1989). 
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sociology, and linguistics. 174 Firms surely differ with respect to the kinds of 
collective purposes or intentions in different situations. Most firms are probably 
more cohesive in this respect than the collective intentions of modern legislatures 
such as the U.S. Congress. 175 For purposes here, however, it is sufficient to 
observe that interpretations of the organizational intentions and purposes 
of firms-as expressed in bylaws, shareholder resolutions, employment hand-
books, managerial orders, etc.-have important legal, moral, and operational 
consequences. 
Recognizing legal personality as an important dimension of theories of firm 
worries some contemporary commentators. According to one leading text, for 
example, recognizing a business firm as a legal "entity" leads down a slippe1y 
slope in which it also "becomes a putative person." In this fashion, they say, 
"reification sometimes leads to anthropomorphism-that is, treating the corpor-
ation [or other firm] as if it were a human being." 176 Economists tend to worry 
even more than jurists about legal personality, probably because the idea poses a 
threat to their view that methodological individualism is the only true path to social 
knowledge. 177 If firms are legal persons acting in markets along with individuals as 
argued here, however, then neoclassical economic models of the firm require 
revision. 
It is true that thinking of firms as "entities" encourages thinking about them in 
terms of "persons" because the ideas are related. It is also true that an uncritical 
extrapolation of the idea of a "person" or "personality" to business enterprises can 
lead in troublesome directions. For example, the legal scholar Joel Bakan's examin-
ation of the corporation as a person derives its approach to "corporate personality" 
from clinical psychology. He concludes from this analysis that modern business 
corporations qualify as "pathological" according to standard tests used to evaluate 
individual human personalities. 178 
17·1 See, e.g., Michael A. Bratman, F,zces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agelll)' 
(Cambridge University Press 1999); Margaret Gilbert, Sociality and Responsibility: New Essays in Plum! 
Subject Theory (Rowman and Littlefield 2000); Raimo Tuomela, The Importance of Us: A Philosophict1l 
Study of Bttsic Soci,tl Notions (Stanford University Press 1995). Cf. Abby Wright, Comment, "For All 
Intents and Purposes: What Collective Intention Tells Us about Congress and Statutory Interpret-
ation," 154 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 983 (2006) (examining how the U.S. Congress as a 
"collective entity" can express a "collective purpose" in its statutes). 
175 See Wright, op. cit., pp. 997, 1015-24 (observing how "it is perfectly natural to speak of a club 
planning an event or a company designing a new product," but Congress "can be said to have shared 
intentions" only in a more limited sense). 
176 Klein, Coffee, and Partnoy, op. cit., p. 118. For an argument that one should not worry so 
much about making various distinctions when dealing with legal concepts and principles that occur 
along a spectrum of possibilities, see Frederick Schauer, "Slippery Slopes," 99 Harvard Law Review 361 
(1985). 
177 Sec, e.g, Jensen and Meckling, op. cit., p. 311 ("the personalization of the firm implied by 
asking questions such as 'what should be the objective function of the firm,' or 'does the firm have a 
social responsibility,' is seriously misleading," and "thinking about organizations as if they were persons 
with motivations and intentions [is erroneous]"). 
178 Joel Bakan, The Corpomtion: The P,zthol.ogiml Pursuit of Profit ,md Power (Free Press 2004). See also 
the documentary with the same title and based on the same material by MarkAchbar, Jennifer Abbott, and 
Joel Bakan (Zeitgeist Films 2004). Consonant with my general thesis here, Bakan views the corporation as 
"an institution" (though he does not discuss other forms of business enterprise). Bal<an, op. cit., p. I. 
Foundations of the Firm l· Business Entities and Legal Persons 47 
This approach may have a rhetorical value in calling attention to the importance 
of the role of business corporations in connection with responsibility for some 
serious social problems. It may also highlight some "inhumane" consequences of 
corporate laws and call into question laws and norms that may encourage or 
mandate "profit only" or "wealth maximization" orientations to business manage-
ment. However, it is not analytically useful in terms of theories of the firm to 
transfer concepts from individual clinical psychology into the realm of organiza-
tional personality. The social problems that the legal recognition of organizational 
persons may help to generate-and, more precisely, the rules and social practices 
applicable to the management and governance of these persons-arc better ad-
dressed from the perspectives of law, economics, politics, philosophy, and other 
social disciplines, rather than diagnosed through an extension of individual psych-
ology. Social psychology is probably relevant, especially with respect to the public 
perceptions of business firms, social behavior in securities trading, and perhaps 
other business-related behavior, but an in-depth discussion of this disciplinary 
perspective is left outside the scope of this book. In addition, it is appropriate to 
inquire how organizational structures and incentives of business enterprise affect 
the individual psychology of human beings who make decisions within the firm 
and on behalf of the firm's objectives. In this respect, critics arc correct to point 
out that a relentless and uncompromising pursuit of profit in some business firms 
will lead to damaging consequences-or, in economic jargon, "negative external-
ities." 179 Legal reform and other social action seeking guidance from other discip-
lines, however, are the more likely effective remedies. After all, one cannot 
prescribe medication or confinement to a hospital for a so-called "pathological" 
corporation. 
At the same time, once one realizes and guards against the possibility of misinter-
preting the meaning of "legal person" (that is, by remembering that it is a flexible 
legal idea adopted to achieve certain social ends and purposes), it becomes apparent 
that thinking about business enterprises as legal persons is very useful. The idea of 
the legal person has been extended for convenience to recognize, animate, and 
"personify" other entities without generating confusion. For example, inanimate 
ships are recognized as "persons" in admiralty law. No less an authority than Oliver 
Wendell Holmes concludes: "It is only by supposing the ship to have been treated 
Bakan's view that the "corporation's legally defined mandate is to pursue, rdcntbsly and without 
exception, its own self-interest, regardless of the often harmful consequences it might cause to others," 
however, is not supported by most legal sources. Id., pp. 1-2. Some economic theories of the firm come 
close to advocating this extreme view, but legal accounts arc usually more moderate, such as the American 
Law lnstitucc's qualification of the "objective" of"corporatc profit and shareholder gain" by the mandate 
to act "within the boundaries set by law" and to "take into account ethical considerations." Sec Preface, 
pages xii and accm~1panying note 13. At le,;st, ~h),s authoritativ~ statemer'.,t of t\'.e corp~rate object~vc 
suggests that Bakan s claim that the corporation ts a psychopathic creamrc that can neither recognize 
nor act upon moral reasons to refrain from harming others" is overstated. Bakan, op. cit., p. GO. For a 
criti<1ue along similar lines, see also Ian B. Lee, "Is There a Cure for Corporate 'Psychopathy'?" 42 
American Business lmv ]011nurl 65, 65-73 (2005). 
179 Sec Bakan, op. cit., pp. 60-1, 70-3. 
I 
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as if endowed with personality, that the arbitrary seeming peculiarities of the 
maritime law can be made intelligible, and on that supposition they at once become 
consistent and logical." 180 One can say the same about much of the law of business 
enterprise. Of course, judges and legislators do not pretend that ships or business 
firms are truly animate objects; they are instruments of people acting collectively. 
But "[w]hatever the hidden ground of policy may be," as Holmes continues, "their 
thought still cloches itself in personifying language." 181 The moral of the story 
follows: The recognition oflegal persons is perfectly fine and often useful, as long as 
one keeps in mind the policy reasons for thinking in this manner and the social 
consequences that are likely to obtain. One need not agree with proposals to extend 
the recognition of legal persons further afield-such as to include wild animals, 
other features of the natural environment (such as wilderness preserves), or other 
"unconventional entities"-to appreciate and accept the usefulness of ascriptions of 
legal personality to business firms. 182 
Non-Western legal systems also recognize the legal personality of business firms. 
In Islamic law, for example, commercial enterprises are recognized to possess a legal 
personality through the development of concepts of dhimma ("juristic container 
within a person") and waaf("properties left in perpetuity"), both of which allow for 
a segregation of assets in firms. 183 Chinese law also recognizes business firms-
including state-owned enterprises-as endowed with separate legal personalities. 184 
As one legal scholar has noted, "in the Confucian view, the collective was morally 
prior to the individual. Hence, for traditional Chinese law, collective legal person-
ality was a given." 185 
These developments indicate another important feature of recognition of the 
legal personality of firms: a demarcation between firms and the political state 
(which, under most theoretical accounts is seen as a legal person too, again as in 
Hobbes' Leviathan). 186 A world of legally recognized organizational persons pro-
180 0. W. Holmes, Jr., The Common law (Little Brown 1881) (Legal Classics Library reprint ed. 
1982), pp. 26-7. See also Blumberg, op. cit., pp. 212-14. 
181 Holmes, op. cit., p. 30. 
182 For an argument for the recognition of entities in the natural environment, see Christopher 
D. Stone, "Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects," 45 Southem 
California lmo Review 450 (1972). See also Christopher D. Scone, "Should Trees Have Standing? 
Revisited: How Far Will Law and Morals Reach? A Pluralist Perspective," 59 Southern California Law 
Review 1, 8 (1985) (arguing for "a more expansive inquiry into the legal and moral status of. .. 
unconventional entities generally-not merely lakes and mountains, but robots and embryos, tribes 
and species, future generations and artifacts"); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-3 (1972) 
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (maintaining that standing should be recognized for the representation of 
"ecological unit[s]"). 
18.l See Mahdi Zahraa, "Legal Personality in Islamic Law," 10 Arab law Quarterly 193, 202-6 
(1995). See also Nabil Saleh, "Arab International Corporations: The Impact of the Shari'a," 8 Arab 
law Q_1111rterly 179, 180-2 (I 993) (recognizing legal personality deriving from dhimm,1 and waaf, but 
noting that these entities do not confer limited liability under Islamic law). 
18·1 Tingmei Fu, "Legal Person in China: Essence and Limits," 41 Americmzjo1m11il of Comparative 
law 261 (1993). 
185 Teemu Ruskola, "Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and Develop-
ment Theory in a Chinese Perspective," 52 Stanford law Review 1599, 1606-7 (2000). 
186 On theories regarding the political state as a legal person, see Vincent, op. cit., pp. 705-6, 
708-9. 
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vides an institutional layer that separates large political nation-states from individ-
ual people. 187 In this respect, business firms as well as other human associations 
arguably compose an intermediate organizational level between nation-states and 
individuals known as "civil society." (Whether and how business firms should be 
considered as belonging to the institutions of "civil society" in political and social 
theory is an important topic, but one lying outside the scope of this book.) 
As Dewey, Hart, Fuller, and other theorists have pointed out, legal persons 
extend only as far as the law allows. This is true of individual people as well as 
organizations. For example, an individual "citizen" is accorded the full protection of 
laws within the jurisdiction of a nation-state. A non-citizen or "alien" is often 
denied certain rights and legal recognition. 188 An extreme historical example of the 
denial of recognition oflegal personality of human beings appears in the institution 
of slavery or, even worse, instances of genocide. 189 The point of raising these 
comparisons here is simply to show that the idea of a legal person is not somehow 
a "natural" category extended to cover only individual human beings. It is inevit-
able that the granting of specific rights and responsibilities-such as the powers to 
sue and be sued, enter into contracts, and own property-bestow recognition of 
business firms as "persons" in a rudimentary legal understanding of the term. To 
avert one's eyes from this social reality is to adopt an extreme and untenable 
position that firms do not exist in legal imagination and legal practice. This basic 
point was made by the Oxford jurist William Martin Geldart a century ago: 
The object of arrangement and classification is to bring together what is like, to separate 
what is distinct. Ilut to tell us at one moment that only persons are the subjects oflegal rights 
and duties ... that they are "deemed" to be persons by the law, is merely to play fast and 
loose with the language. If corporate bodies are rMlly like individuals the bearers of legal 
rights and duties, they must have something in common which qualifies them to be such; 
and if that is not personality, we may fairly ask to be told what it is. Or if the rights and 
duties attributed to them are not really theirs, we may again fairly ask to be told whose they 
are. 190 
Once firms are recognized legally as persons, real consequences follow in practice. 
From an institutional perspective, many questions involving the legal personality 
of firms remain open. Some issues-such as whether a firm can appear in court and 
187 The nature of institutional legal persons deserves much greater academic discussion than it 
currently receives. For exceptions, sec Meir Dan-Cohen, Rights, Persons, mul 01g1111iz11tions: A legal 
Theory Ji1r B11ret111crt1tic Society (University of California Press 1986); Meir Dan-Cohen, "Between 
Selves and Collectivities: Toward a Jurisprudence of Identity," 61 University of Chimgo Lmv Review 
1213 (1994). 
188 For an examination of the topic in U.S. law, sec Gerald L. Neuman, Strangers to the Constitution: 
lmmigrt111ts, Borders, t111d Fundmnemtd law (Princeton University Press 1996). Sec also Frederic 
R. Coudert, "The Rights and Remedies of Aliens in National Courts," 5 American Society of 
lnterntttionttl lmv Proceedings 192 (1911) (discussing the historical trend toward recognizing rights 
of aliens). 
189 Sec, e.g., Milton Meltzer, Slavery: A World History (Da Capo Press, rev. ed., 1993); Samantha 
Power, A Problem from Hell: America 1111d the Age ofG'enocit!e (Basic Books 2002). 
190 W.M. Geldart, legit! l'ersowtlity (Oxford University Press 1924), p. 10 (reprint of inaugural 
lecture delivered at Oxford in 1910} (original emphasis). 
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be represented by a lawyer-are now relatively well settled, though hard questions 
remain with respect to some details of this representation. For example, jurisdic-
tional questions about whether or not a firm should count as a full-fledged "citizen" 
arise in a manner analogous to individuals. 191 Also, lawyers who represent firms 
have ethical responsibilities to represent the business enterprise as a whole, which is 
often a difficult task given the complicated structures of modern firms. 192 Ques-
tions of the attribution of some human characteristics to firms as persons, such as 
whether firms may be describing as having a "race" for certain legal purposes, 
provide yet another example. 193 
Other substantive issues, such as whether and to what extent constitutional 
rights applicable to individuals should apply as well to business firms-and whether 
and to what extent criminal laws should apply to firms-continue to be contested 
as well. Objections have been made to expanding both constitutional law and 
criminal law to business firms, at least with respect to business corporations. 
In U.S. constitutional law, the argument has been made that constitutional 
rights are meant to protect individual people only-not organizational persons. 194 
This argument has not been persuasive over time, however, and constitutional 
rights for corporations (and other business firms) have been recognized in various 
areas, though not universally. 195 (Chapter 7 revisits this question with respect to 
the corporate constitutional rights to political free speech.) 
With respect to whether criminal law should apply to business firms, there are 
rwo schools of thought. 196 On one view, organizational persons do not possess the 
requisite intention (mens rea) needed for criminal culpability, and criminal law 
should therefore apply only to individual human beings who have this capacity. l 97 
A few civil law countries reject the idea of corporate or enterprise-level criminality, 
though the general trend is to recognize such liability. 198 A second view approves 
l'JI Sec, e.g., Blumberg, op. cit., pp. 168-201; Robert R. Drury, "The Regulation and Recognition 
of Foreign Corporations: Responses to the 'Delaware Syndrome,"' 57 Cambridge Law journr1l 165 
(1998). 
192 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., "Ethical Dilemmas of Corporate Counsel," 46 Emory Law joumal 
1011 (1997); William H. Simon, "Whom (Or What) Does the Organization's Lawyer Represent? An 
Anatomy of lrmaclient Conflict," 91 California Law Review 57 (2003); E. Norman Veasey and 
Christine T. DiGuglielmo, "The Tensions, Stresses, and Professional Responsibilities of the Lawyer 
for the Corporation," 62 Business Lawyer 1 (2006). 
193 Sec Richard R. W. Brooks, "Incorporating Race," 106 Columbia Law Review 2023 (2006) 
(discussing recent cases holding that "race" can be legally attributed to business firms). 
191 Sec, e.g., Wheeling Steel Corp. v. G!tlnder, 337 U.S. 562, 576-81 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). 
195 Sec Blumberg, op. cit., pp. 30-5; Mayer, op. cit.; Ribstein, op. cit.; Note, "Constitutional 
Rights of the Corporate Person," op. cit. 
196 See John C. Coffee, Jr., '"No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick': An Unscandalized Inquiry into 
the Problem of Corporate Punishment," 79 Michigan L,1w Review 386, 407 (1981). 
197 See, e.g., William S. Laufer, "Corporate Culpability and the Limits of Law," 6 Business Ethics 
Quarterly 311, 313 (1996) (" Many philosophers, ethicists, and criminologists question whether 
corporate entities should be criminally ... responsible for the actions of employees.") 
198 Sec, e.g., Coffee, op. cit., p. 444; sec also V.S. Khanna, "Corporate Criminal Liability: What 
Purpose Does It Serve?" 109 H,1rvt1rd Law Review 1477, 1490-1 (1996) (noting strict European legal 
standards for imposing corporate criminal liability and observing that Germany is a holdout to the 
trend toward adopting a regime of corporate criminal liability). 
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criminal liability for business firms and other organizations on policy grounds of 
deterrence as well as retribution. 199 
Despite some of the strong objections to constitutional and criminal law exten-
sions to include firms as legal persons, it is probably fair to say that in many 
jurisdictions, such as in the United States, new subfields have arisen to include what 
might be called corporate constitutional law and corporate criminal law. Or, more 
precisely, in terminology that encompasses the contemporary variety of available 
legal forms of firms, we might speak of the constitutional law and criminal law of 
business persons. 
The questions in these subfields can also interrelate. For example, assuming that 
criminal law applies to business corporations, different U.S. constitutional rights 
protecting them as criminal defendants may apply-or not. The Supreme Court 
has held that the Fifth Amendment's protection against "double jeopardy" (trying a 
person for the same crime twice) applies to firms such as corporations. 200 But the 
Court held that a business firm may not invoke the Fifth Amendment's right 
against "self-incrimination."201 
Adopting an institutional legal perspective does not resolve all of the questions 
about whether and how the legal fictions, entities, and persons of business firms 
should be recognized for various purposes. It also does not resolve many complex 
and important questions about how these firms, once recognized, should be legally 
treated. At least, though, an institutional legal theory of the firm provides a 
foundation for beginning to evaluate and answer these questions-again from the 
perspectives of different potential policy goals and principles. An institutional 
theory of the firm asserts that concepts of "fictions," "entities," and "persons" are 
foundational to understanding business enterprises. And this is not a new claim. 202 
19'1 See, e.g., Note, "Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior 
through Criminal Sanctions," 92 llarvard Law Review 1227, 1231-41, 1365-8 (1979). But sec 
Khanna, op. cit. (arguing against corporate criminal liability as unsatisfactory on deterrence grounds 
and favoring alternatives of civil enforcement). 
200 Sec, e.g., United Sttttes v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (I 977). 
201 Sec, e.g., Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988).) See also I3lumberg, op. cir., pp. 38-40; 
E11stem Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 557 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting); F!tl!e v. Henkel, 201 
U.S. 43 (1906) (discussing theories of corporation in application of constitutional principles in 
criminal context). 
202 For historical perspective, see Corpomte Personality in the 20th Century (Ross Grantham and 
Charles Rickett eds.) (Hart Publishing 1998) (collecting essays discussing one of the earliest English 
cases recognizing firms as separate "entities" and "persons," Stdom011 v. S11!0111011 &Co., [1847] A.C. 22, 
HL, which held that a sole proprietor may invoke the corporate form against claims for personal 
liability from creditors). Stl!omon has been described as "a celebrated case" which "haunts every 
discussion of corporate entity and limited liability." Bernard F. Cataldo, "Limited Liability with 
One-Man Companies and Subsidiaiy Corporations," 18 Law ,mcl Conte111pomry l'roblems 473, 478 
(I 953). See also Paul Vinogradoff, "Juridical Persons," 24 Col11mbit1 Law Review 594, 595-7 (I 924). 
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